

Challenges for This Kind of War: Modifying Army Awards for a New Century of Conflict

**A Monograph
by
MAJOR Brent A Clemmer
U.S. Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 2011

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 18-05-2011		2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2010 – April 2011	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CHALLENGES FOR THIS KIND OF WAR: MODIFYING ARMY AWARDS FOR A NEW CENTURY OF CONFLICT				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Brent A. Clemmer (U.S. Army)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College 731 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) CGSC	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <p>The United States Army continues to execute counterinsurgency operations in support of the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan. However, inculcating a counterinsurgency ethos into the Army continues to be a challenge. The Army's reward system, which drives individual motivation and reflects corporate values, plays a much-overlooked role in this endeavor. In the Army, as with most organizations, pay, promotion and awards form a tripod of extrinsic motivation, and represent tools that the institution can use to reward or reinforce specific behavior. Today and in the future, pay and promotion have a limited effect to promote and reinforce the development of a counterinsurgency ethos in the Army. The reasons are clear. The Army's award system, developed primarily during the World Wars, is static and rewards combat actions more common to high intensity operations rather than counterinsurgency (COIN). Furthermore, the 'Pyramid of Honor,' which focuses on valorous acts, is deeply ingrained in Army culture. Recently, the Army has spent significant energy creating and revising many facets of doctrine, including the creation of a counterinsurgency field manual. COIN doctrine calls for actions, which limit incentives in the award system.</p> <p>This monograph explains the paradox that results. New Army doctrine directs soldiers to work by, with, and through a host nation. Yet, in Afghanistan, the Army primarily rewards its soldiers for engaging and killing the enemy. This incongruity in Afghanistan produced the wrong kind of incentives and thus, unintended consequences that led to an endorsement for lethal methods as the default. This particular study makes an analysis of the specifics in Afghanistan to understand what the award system needs to consider as additional criteria for incentives. Better understanding of what criteria promotes this kind of action are paramount for success.</p>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS U.S. Army Awards, Incentives, Afghanistan, Doctrine, Counterinsurgency					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: (U)			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES (U) 51	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Wayne W. Grigsby Jr. COL, U.S. Army
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913-758-3302

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJOR Brent Alan Clemmer

Title of Monograph: Challenges for This Kind of War: Modifying Army Awards for a New Century of Conflict

Approved by:

Gregory Hospodor, Ph.D

Monograph Director

Russell M. Livingston, COL, QM

Second Reader

Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., COL, IN

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the US Army Command and General Staff College, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Abstract

CHALLENGES FOR THIS KIND OF WAR: MODIFYING ARMY AWARDS FOR A NEW CENTURY OF CONFLICT by MAJOR Brent A Clemmer, U.S. Army, 84 pages.

The United States Army continues to execute counterinsurgency operations in support of the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan. However, inculcating a counterinsurgency ethos into the Army continues to be a challenge. The Army's reward system, which drives individual motivation and reflects corporate values, plays a much-overlooked role in this endeavor. In the Army, as with most organizations, pay, promotion and awards form a tripod of extrinsic motivation, and represent tools that the institution can use to reward or reinforce specific behavior. Today and in the future, pay and promotion have a limited effect to promote and reinforce the development of a counterinsurgency ethos in the Army. The reasons are clear. The Army's award system, developed primarily during the World Wars, is static and rewards combat actions more common to high intensity operations rather than counterinsurgency (COIN). Furthermore, the 'Pyramid of Honor,' which focuses on valorous acts, is deeply ingrained in Army culture. Recently, the Army has spent significant energy creating and revising many facets of doctrine, including the creation of a counterinsurgency field manual. COIN doctrine calls for actions, which limit incentives in the award system.

This monograph explains the paradox that results. New Army doctrine directs soldiers to work by, with, and through a host nation. Yet, in Afghanistan, the Army primarily rewards its soldiers for engaging and killing the enemy. This incongruity in Afghanistan produced the wrong kind of incentives and thus, unintended consequences that led to an endorsement for lethal methods as the default. This particular study makes an analysis of the specifics in Afghanistan to understand what the award system needs to consider as additional criteria for incentives. Better understanding of what criteria promotes this kind of action are paramount for success.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	2
Background Information	8
<i>Three Types of Rewards</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>The Legacy Award System.....</i>	<i>16</i>
Building Award Criteria for Afghanistan.....	21
Analysis of Awards in Afghanistan	30
Afghanistan Case Study: Wanat and the Aftermath	35
<i>The Event.....</i>	<i>35</i>
<i>The Aftermath</i>	<i>36</i>
<i>Investigations and Analysis</i>	<i>37</i>
Recent Developments with Awards in Afghanistan.....	42
<i>Courageous Restraint.....</i>	<i>42</i>
<i>Combat Army Achievement Medal with V Device.....</i>	<i>43</i>
<i>The Purple Heart</i>	<i>45</i>
Conclusions and Recommendations.....	47
Appendices	51
<i>Appendix 1 2011 Basic Pay Chart.....</i>	<i>51</i>
<i>Appendix 2 Special Pay Incentives for Health Care Professionals</i>	<i>53</i>
<i>Appendix 3 U.S. Army Decorations and Service Awards</i>	<i>54</i>
<i>Appendix 4 Major U.S. Army Badges and Dates Created.....</i>	<i>59</i>
<i>Appendix 5 Department of Defense and Joint Service Awards,.....</i>	<i>60</i>
<i>Appendix 6 Mission Command Graphic</i>	<i>61</i>
<i>Appendix 7 Example of the type of information used to develop database.....</i>	<i>62</i>
<i>Appendix 8 Letter from 3-2 SBCT commander re Army Achievement Medal.....</i>	<i>64</i>
<i>Appendix 9 Award Database.....</i>	<i>65</i>
Bibliography.....	68

Introduction

Incentives are the cornerstone of modern life. And understanding them—or, often, ferreting them out—is the key to solving just about any riddle...

— Steven D. Levitt PhD¹

The author has written a thesis on the Army award system previously.² This monograph builds on that previous thesis, focusing specifically on Afghanistan, where the author will shortly be serving. The background information, based on the previous work is vitally important for the reader to understand the context in which the award system operates. This allows for a fuller exploration and synthesis of the realities and perceptions evident in Afghanistan.

A visitor walking into the headquarters building of an Army battalion would, see a row of pictures showing both the officer and non-commissioned officer chain of command for the unit. The individuals in the photos, depending on the uniforms worn, display awards and badges symbolizing achievements earned. Much as a professor has a Curriculum Vitae and a job applicant a resume on paper, a soldier wears the symbols of success on the uniform. Although the meanings of the multicolored ribbons on a uniform may mean nothing to the visitor, to those who wear the uniform, there is deep significance, tracing a heritage back to the founding of the United States, and even further to the Legions of old.

¹ Steven D. Levitt, *Freakonomics* (HarperCollins, New York 2005). 11

² See Brent Clemmer, *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army's Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations.* (Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009)

The Army officially describes its awards program as follows: “The goal of the total Army awards program is to foster mission accomplishment by recognizing excellence of both military and civilian members of the force and motivating them to high levels of performance and service.”³ Awards serve as a motivational tool for the Army. The Army organized these tools into a system that was developed and refined over time during the United States’ involvement in World War I and World War II. New awards were created since World War II, yet the basic structure into which they fit remains unchanged. This system of awards, which was successful in rewarding the actions needed in high intensity, state-on-state warfare of the 20th century, may not be suitable for the current conflicts such as Afghanistan or those most likely to come in the future.

The United States Army has been fighting in Afghanistan for almost ten years.⁴ This conflict, has lasted longer than the nation’s involvement in both the World Wars. Trying to categorize or typecast the type of warfare waged in Afghanistan is a particular challenge. Depending on when and where an observer studies it will have a different character. One constant is that Afghanistan is very different from the conventional interstate wars the Defense Department has historically prepared for.

Recently, Defense Secretary Robert Gates reinforced the notion that the army would face a future more like Afghanistan than the Second World War when he stated,

³ Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, “Army Regulation 600-8-2,” *Military Awards* (Headquarters Department of the Army, January 11, 2007), 1.

⁴ The author participated in the 18 October Airborne Assault raid in southern Afghanistan, the first publicized introduction of ground troops in the conflict.

“Looking ahead,...the Army must also confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements...”⁵

This monograph, which focuses specifically on the Army awards system, seeks to answer the following questions: Does the Army’s awards system adequately support counterinsurgency doctrine and the types of operations currently conducted in Afghanistan? In other words, are soldiers who are supposed to do one task, namely engage in counterinsurgency best practices, receiving commensurate awards? Or, does the focus remain on the actions needed to succeed in high intensity conflicts? This monograph examines and answers each of these questions in the following sections, concluding that the Army’s awards system continues primarily to reward actions congruent with past practices, rather than adapting to the current conflict. The consequence is that, although combat valor helps to drive tactical success, emphasizing, or perhaps over-emphasizing this endangers operational and strategic level success.

Chapter II, the background chapter, provides an overview of the reward system, to include a brief review of the relevant literature. The chapter differentiates between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. It also discusses the two other types of rewards soldiers earn, money and promotion to a higher rank, and briefly examines some of the challenges that monetary and promotional rewards pose in the current environment. Awards remain the most effective tool the Army has to reinforce desired behavior by soldiers on the ground in today’s conflicts.

⁵ Robert M. Gates, "Speech As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, West Point, NY, Friday, February 25 2011." (www.defense.gov. February 25, 2011. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539> accessed February 26, 2011), 1

This system traces its beginnings to 1782 when General George Washington a badge of distinction for enlisted men and noncommissioned officers. These early awards were rarely used and quickly forgotten, and in the early years and wars of the United States, the system was seldom needed. Instead, promotions on the field were the reward a soldier might expect for a display of valor.

This approach to recognition changed with U.S. involvement in World War I. The number of decorations went from two, as the ‘Great War’ began, to the current number, which, including skill badges is over 100. Clearly, with the publication of counterinsurgency doctrine, actions different, and in many cases diametrically opposed to those most desired in high intensity conflict have emerged. This chapter also summarizes counterinsurgency theory and current army doctrine, along with the senior general’s guidance to highlight the most desired actions in counterinsurgency.

Chapter III’s focus is the award of the Silver Star has been earned in Afghanistan. An analysis of a database of Silver Star recipients created by the author considers whether the actions of today’s soldier are reflective of those actions outlined, described, and desired in theory and doctrine. Were the American soldiers working with the host nation forces? Although there have been improvements, collaborative actions remain under-awarded, and unilateral high intensity actions are more frequently rewarded.

Chapter IV is a case study of the 2008 engagement in Afghanistan at the village of Wanat with particular attention given to its aftermath and narrative. Nine soldiers died in the fight at the Combat Outpost. The unit involved was clearly attempting to operate using counterinsurgency doctrine in its largest sense. Yet after investigations that produced thousands of pages and spanned almost two years, the unit leaders faced first

reprimands, then absolution. In the end, the same leaders blamed by the Army for their failures also earned high awards for their actions. Wanat provides an excellent example where the Army's award system was able to reward actions necessary for a tactical victory, yet do nothing to reinforce or incentivize actions vital in a counterinsurgency. Indeed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Waygal valley was an operational defeat.

Chapter V discusses recent developments, placing a focus on attempts to create awards that either recognize actions key to counterinsurgency doctrine or attempts to give lower level commanders the ability to approve existing rewards. It also explores the changes made to the entitlement of the Purple Heart, recognizing the differences inherent in the current conflicts. Leaders and organizations in Afghanistan are aware of the challenges concerning awards and incentives, but have been unsuccessful in implementing any changes.

Chapter VI outlines conclusions, offers recommendations, and suggests areas for further study.

A few notes on methods: there is ample data available from Army sources on the number and type of awards received in Afghanistan. Why and how the soldier earned the award is impossible to tease out using only official Army figures. To find these details, the author read hundreds of different citations and descriptions of the events surrounding the incidents that led to the awards, and then coded these into a database.

A final note: the author of this monograph writes without of any sense of personal grievance towards the Army awards system. In January 2007, while serving as a company commander in 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, the author engaged in a vicious engagement involving a Shiite cult north of the

city of Najaf. Because of that day's actions, the Army awarded the author the Silver Star, and the men under his command earned over 70 decorations for valor. Only when the author began his graduate studies and examined irregular warfare did he recognize the contrast between what policy and doctrine asks soldiers to do and what soldiers are actually rewarded for doing. The author has done previous work looking at the reward system as a whole, this work focuses specifically on Afghanistan where it appears America's Army will continue to engage. Reflection on actions taken and not taken, rewarded and un-rewarded, forms the basis for this monograph.

Background Information

A cursory look inside most organizations reveals an array of tools used to elicit and to direct desired behavior. Dr. Carol Sansone, a leading expert in motivation theory, writes, “Unarguably, our age is the age of rewards. The regulation of behavior by consciously constructed and socially imposed reward contingencies, whether blatant or subtle, is ubiquitous within contemporary Western oriented societies.”⁶ What makes people behave in certain ways, and how organizations can modify and control this behavior, are subjects of long standing interest.⁷

The U.S. Army, depends on its soldiers to be motivated to accomplish goals deemed important to the institution as a whole. Generally, motivation comprises two parts: intrinsic and extrinsic. The Army recognizes that both are key parts of a “motivated” soldier.

Intrinsic motivation occurs “when an activity satisfies basic human needs for competence and control which makes the activity interesting and likely to be performed for its own sake rather than as a means to an end.”⁸ This sort of motivation is of decisive importance to the military, where intrinsic motivation is embodied in the core value of

⁶ Carol Sansone and Judith M. Harackiewicz, *Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation* (San Diego: Academic Press, 2000), 15, quoted in Brent Clemmer, *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army’s Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations.* (Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 5.

⁷ From Skinner’s Box, (where an animal, usually a rodent is trained to push a lever, and is rewarded with food for doing so) to Dr. Steven Kerr, there has long been academic interest in why people (and animals) act in certain ways.

⁸ Sansone and Harackiewicz, *Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation*, 444. This is arguably moving beyond intrinsic task motivation to normative affective motivation. My point here is not to delve deeply into different types of intrinsic motivation, just to note that it exists and is a strong force.

‘selfless service.’⁹ Members of the Spencer family, five brothers all serving in the U.S. military, capture this type of motivation. The youngest states, “I can remember going to a Fourth of July parade growing up and seeing the local color guard march by. I felt it was the neatest thing in the world and I wanted to be a part of it. We always had the drive to serve our country; I didn’t do it because my brothers did it. It was more for a love of country and to just do my part.”¹⁰

The author’s previous work also identified the second part of motivation, extrinsic motivation, “defined as motivation based on something external to the activity or external to the person. Within the Army, the main external motivations are pay, promotion and awards. These three rewards are the primary tools that the Army has at its disposal to modify and reinforce behavior.”¹¹

Dr. Erik Jansen, who has studied reward systems within many large companies colleague explains :

The reward system functions to create goal congruence between the individual and the organization. Individuals selected into organizations have different values and valences for rewards and outcomes. The reward system functions to induce diverse individuals to contribute to the organization through the management of rewarding and

⁹ Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 1 The Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005), 1-16. It is further defined: Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own.

¹⁰ Jason Watkins, “Why We Serve, 5 Spencer Brothers Serve across 3 Military Branches,” *Army Times* (May 4, 2009): 8. quoted in Brent Clemmer, *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army’s Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations.* (Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 5-6

¹¹ Brent Clemmer, *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army’s Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations.* (Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 6.

aversive consequences. It functions to motivate individual and collaborative performances.¹²

All things being equal, the Army ought to be able to use any of the three, pay, promotion or awards to provide motivation. However, awards are the tool the Army can most easily use or modify to reward desired behavior.

Three Types of Rewards

Soldier receives monetary compensation based upon first, rank, and then the time served. There is a monetary incentive for continued promotion. However, after a certain amount of time in any rank, there ceases to be any additional pay for longevity of service. In other words, once an O-4 (Major in the Army) has more than 18 years of service, he no longer receives time-in-service raises. The same prospect would occur to an E-5 Sergeant after twelve years of service.

Base pay has no relationship to how well or poorly a task is completed. Nor does the base pay reflect any special skills a soldier may possess.¹³ The point is performance is *not directly* related to pay.

While serving in an area like Afghanistan, a service member is entitled to a variety of different types of pay in addition to base pay; such as Hardship Duty Pay and Hostile Fire Pay, these special compensations, along with not having to pay federal income tax can add up to over an additional \$1000 dollars in pay a month. Again, as with base pay, there is no connection between performance and pay. Therefore, a combat arms

¹² Jansen, Erik, "Toward a Strategic Reward System Perspective" (PhD Dissertation, University of Southern California, 2003), 20, quoted in Brent Clemmer, *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army's Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations.* (Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 7

¹³ There is special incentive pay for medical specialties. See Appendix for a current pay chart showing the breakdown.

soldier who is constantly on the move, leaves a secure base, and interacts with the local population earns no more money than a supply services soldier who never leaves the same secure base. Somewhat ironically, the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows for the forfeiture of pay as punishment for unlawful acts...there is however no provision to use targeted pay for specific actions as an incentive.¹⁴

Promotion to a higher rank is another tool of external motivation. The Army operates a closed system. To reach a higher rank in the organization, one must have served at a lower rank.¹⁵ For example, if a sudden need for more Majors arises, there is no mechanism to import them from outside the system. Figure 1 shows the shortages in Captains and Majors forecasted for the next several years. The gap between the solid mass and the solid line indicates a shortfall between expected strength of a year group and the requirements filled by that year group. The shortfall of the Army's Captains and Majors continues at least through FY 2013. One of the effects of this gap is that a promotion system that was once competitive has now ceased to be so.

¹⁴ Joint Service Committee on *Military Justice. Manual for Courts-Martial United States*. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), A2-4

¹⁵ There are exception is in very low density and specialized jobs such as physicians, lawyers and chaplains who generally enter as O-3 Captains.




Figure 1. FY 2007 Shortages of Officers by Year Group¹⁶

The once competitive promotion system has changed to near universal selection for promotion.¹⁷ Table 1 shows data from fiscal year 2010. Of the 703 officers in the primary year group considered for promotion, 689 (98%) were selected. When factoring in officers selected from the above-the-zone and below-the-zone pools, 785 officers (111.7%) of the targeted year group were selected for promotion.

¹⁶ Human Resource Command briefing slide presented to Army Field Grade officers in 2010 at the Command and General Staff College

¹⁷ The author and others who entered the Army in the mid 1990's remember a time when even being promoted from 2LT to 1LT was not a sure thing. The point here is that, at least within the commissioned officer population, the promise of promotion has been greatly expanded since 2001.

Table 1. FY 2010 LTC Promotion Board Results¹⁸

Fiscal Year 2010 Lieutenant Colonel Selection Board Released 30 June 2010		
Previously Considered	First Time Considered	Below the Zone
Above the Zone (AZ) # considered / # selected	Primary Zone (PZ) # considered / # selected	Below the Zone (BZ) # considered / # selected
Maneuver Fire and Effects (MFE)		
34 / 18	703 / 689	680 / 78
52.9%	98.0%	11.5%
Operational Support (OS)		
131 / 42	432 / 352	391 / 43
32.1%	81.5%	11.0%
Force Sustainment		
114 / 16	367 / 281	347 / 32
14.0%	76.6 %	9.2%

Consider the effect the promotion rates and the pyramid shown above have on a young or mid-career officer. In the past, promotion, especially to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, was most assuredly not a certain thing. Taking the hardest jobs and excelling at them was the path that many young officers thought assured promotion. Clearly, with promotion rates at or near 100%, an officer in the Maneuver Fire and Effects branches would assume that as long as there is no *negative* information in his file one does not have to go ‘above and beyond’ to earn a the promotion. Even the Secretary of Defense, commenting on the shortages of officers for an Army at war, said in 2011, “The result of meeting these shortfalls has been essentially automatic promotion for elevation to Major

¹⁸ Jesse R. Cross, The Quartermaster General's Newsletter (Fort Lee, Virginia: Quartermaster School, July-September 2010.)

and Lieutenant Colonel.”¹⁹ The effects of promotions for all officers without regard to performance will not be understood for years to come. Although antidotal, the author knows many high performing field grade officers who are deeply frustrated that their efforts, which exceed the average, will not set them apart in consideration for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.²⁰ Promotion has become a matter of meeting a certain time mark rather than demonstrated competency.

In previous work, the author amplifies the point that there appeared to be very low standards even for the senior officers running the campaigns, citing prominent strategist Eliot Cohen:

Not all generals are up to the task...not a single general has been removed for ineffectiveness during the course of this war. The current promotion system does not take into account actual effectiveness in counterinsurgency. We need not great guys but effective guys. Routine promotion and assignment systems for generals in wartime is a disaster.²¹

In the past, a soldier might have been motivated to excel at this type of assignment by the prospect of promotion. But it now appears he will be promoted regardless of whether he has the ability and wherewithal to engage a potentially hostile community to build a

¹⁹ Robert M. Gates, "Speech As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, West Point, NY, Friday, February 25 2011." (www.defense.gov. February 25, 2011. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539> accessed February 26, 2011), 2 quoted in Brent Clemmer, *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army's Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations.* (Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 11-12

²⁰ The command select board for Battalion Command is the first point where there is true 'cut', especially in the maneuver fire and effects branches.

²¹ Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 99-100, quoted in Brent Clemmer, *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army's Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations.* (Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 12. For an additional article commenting on senior leadership in Iraq see Paul Yingling, "A Failure in Generalship," *Armed Forces Journal* (May 2007), <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198> (accessed January 20, 2011).

relationship, of he takes a pass and chooses not too. Is there the same incentive is for signing up for and tackling the more challenging and dangerous jobs today as there was in the past ? The practice of promoting virtually all officers unintentionally rewards risk adverse behavior. “Playing it safe” gains an officer the benefit of promotion while avoiding the risks entailed by taking tough assignments.

For policy makers considering the idea of rewarding Army officers for certain actions, the question must be asked: if everyone is assured of being promoted, can promotion be used as a tool to reward specific behavior? The answer is clearly no. This leaves the award system as the best tool available for these decision makers to influence action and behavior in the force.

Pay and promotion are important in both civilian and military organizations. However, today the current methods of allocating pay and promotion in the military diminish their effects. Consequently, awards are the best tool the military has to reinforce the behavior it desires in its soldiers. Specifics of this behavior will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

In many regards, awards are visible status symbols. Here it is important simply to recognize the power these symbolic pieces of cloth and metal has on soldiers, even in other cultures! The following passage, about Afghan soldiers in 2002, captures the authority of visual status symbols such as awards. A U.S. Special Forces soldier explains, “You think it’s a trivial thing, but they wore that [buttons symbolizing their rank] on every single outfit. If they took their coat off, they would take the pin off and put it back

on their next outer garment. It means a lot to them. They were proud about their ranks. Just a little button on a safety pin. That gave them their status on that structure.”²²

The Legacy Award System

The institutionalization of awards and decorations In the U.S. Army occurred after the end of the Revolutionary War.²³ It was not until August 1782, almost a year after the victory at Yorktown, that George Washington created the Badge of Military Merit. In the order creating it he states:

The General, ever desirous to cherish a virtuous ambition in his soldiers, as well as to foster and encourage every species of military merit, directs that, whenever any singularly meritorious action is performed, the author of it shall be permitted to wear on his facings, over his left breast, the figure of a heart in purple cloth or silk, edged with narrow lace or binding. Not only instances of unusual gallantry, but also of extraordinary fidelity and essential service in any way, shall meet with a due reward...the road to glory in a patriot army and a free country is thus opened to all. This order is also to have retrospect to the earliest days of the war, and to be considered a permanent one.²⁴

This purple cloth shaped as a heart exists today as the Purple Heart medal, and holds special significance because of its creation by the ‘Father’ of our country. It truly was revolutionary, as the contemporary armies of Europe had not made any award available

²² Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die* (New York, NY: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 72.

²³ The Continental Congress did award several gold medals to key leaders for their actions: Washington for service driving the British out of Boston, Gates for Saratoga, and Jones after the taking of HMS *Serapis*. Congress also awarded the Andre Medal to the three soldiers who captured Major John Andre with West Point’s defensive plans, given to him by Benedict Arnold.

²⁴ Frank Foster and Lawrence Borts, *A Complete Guide to All United States Military Medals* (Fountain Inn: MOA Press, 2005), 5, quoted in Brent Clemmer, *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army’s Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations*. (Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 17.

for enlisted men to qualify.²⁵ The Badge of Military Merit ceased to be used after the initial issuances,. One possible reason was later generals felt uneasy presenting an award with ties to such a legend as Washington.²⁶

Despite two major conflicts prior to the Civil War, the Army's awards system was not reestablished. Incentives for superb action on the field was typically a brevet promotion.²⁷ For example, Thomas Jackson (the moniker of Stonewall would come later) earned several brevet promotions during the Mexican American war. For gallantry at Contreras Jackson was given the brevet of captain. For gallantry at Chapultepec, he was breveted major. An incredible rise, Jackson went from brevet second lieutenant to substantive first lieutenant and brevet major within six months²⁸. Not until after the Civil War had begun, was a new physical award, the Medal of Honor, created.²⁹ President Lincoln first approved the award on July 12, 1862.³⁰ During the Civil War, the Union awarded 1,198 Army Medals of Honor, unfortunately the approval criteria was not standardized³¹

²⁵ John White, "The Award No One Wants," *The New American* (October 29, 2007): 34-38.

²⁶ Bob Edwards, "The Purple Heart." National Public Radio. (May 27, 2002.
<http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/patc/purpleheart.html> accessed May 16, 2011): 2.

²⁷ A brevet promotion entitled an officer to hold and wear a higher rank although he would be paid at his regular rank. In some ways it is similar to the current tradition of frocking an officer if he is serving in a position normally held by someone of the next higher rank.

²⁸ Byron Farwell, *Stonewall*. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 59.

²⁹ To be technically correct, there are three types of the Medal of Honor. The Army, Navy and Air Force each have their own unique physical version of the Medal.

³⁰ John E. Strandberg and Roger J. Bender, *The Call of Duty: Military Awards and Decorations of the United States of America* (San Jose: James Bender Publishing, 1994), 17.

³¹ U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Military Awards Branch, "Statistics by Region, Conflict or Incident," www.hrc.army.mil. (Accessed on April 22, 2009).
https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/awards/STATS/Nov_10_MAB_Statistics_Conflict%2c_Operation%2c_or_Incident.doc (accessed February 1, 2011), 1.

For years, the Medal of Honor was the only military medal that the U.S. awarded.³² Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901, and the foreign policy traditions and the uses of the Army had greatly changed. According to Walter McDougall, the war with Spain brought ‘progressive imperialism’ and, as he states, “Imagine: the American people and government and government allowed themselves to be swept up by a hurricane of militant righteousness into a revolutionary foreign war, determined to slay a dragon and free a damsel in distress.”³³ Roosevelt, who had of course participated in the war, recognized that in operating away from the shores of the United States, the military in obtaining colonies by force was doing something different than it had in the past. Major General Adna Chaffee, while serving as the commander of the American forces involved in the China relief expedition started the movement.³⁴ Thus, a new category of award, one that recognized service in a specific conflict came into existence. By 1909, the Army developed campaign medals retroactively recognize veterans of the Civil War, Indian Wars, Spanish War, Philippine Insurrection, and China Relief Expedition of 1900-1. At the same time the tradition of wearing them on the tunic or jacket began, which continues to this day.³⁵

As the First World War loomed in 1916, the Army began looking at its awards and decorations. The Secretary of War established a panel of five Generals to review all 2,625 Army Medals of Honor presented to that time. The result was the revocation of 911

³² The Certificate of Merit existed, but was just that, a paper certificate not a medal or ribbon.

³³ Walter A McDougall, *Promised Land Crusader State*. (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 118.

³⁴ John E. Strandberg and Roger J. Bender. *The Call of Duty: Military Awards and Decorations of the United States of America*. (San Jose: James Bender Publishing, 1994), 148..

³⁵ Foster and Lawrence, *A Complete Guide to All United States Military Medals*, 6.

medals, most awarded during the Civil War. By revoking these awards, many which had been awarded for petty reasons, such as for re-enlistment, and by establishing much tougher criteria, the panel had created a new problem for the Army—how to recognize the heroism and outstanding performance of military personnel who performed at levels somewhat below those that would justify being awarded the Medal of Honor.³⁶ The scalable system was in the development.

The two World Wars had a defining influence on the Army's award system, especially with respect to decorations for valor, merit, and service. Following McDougall's framework, the foreign policy of 'Liberal Internationalism' championed by President Wilson stated the country was fighting, "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world."³⁷ Interestingly, a soldier on the eve of the country's entry to WWI could earn the Medal of Honor, or nothing. Motivation to fight for such lofty goals. Some sort of award incentives was needed to provide. Additionally, the American would fight beside allies, both French and British who had a developed system for rewarding valor.³⁸ The Army Award system truly came into being during the major, industrial state on state combat that characterized the World Wars. As the Second World War ended, a soldier could, for valorous acts against the enemy earn: The Air Medal, The

³⁶ In addition to, a large number of Medals of Honor given to soldiers who re-enlisted, some 20 were given the honor guard that accompanied President Lincoln's body to its burial site these actions are not consistent with the sort of valor that would later be associated with the Medal of Honor; Peter Collier, *Medal of Honor: Portraits of Valor beyond the Call of Duty* (New York: Artisan, 2003), 238.

³⁷ Walter A McDougall, *Promised Land Crusader State*. (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 136

³⁸ H. Taprell Dorling's work *Ribbons and Medals* New York, Doubleday, 1974, is an excellent general volume that covers decorations from the major militaries of the world.

Bronze Star, The Distinguished Flying Cross, The Silver Star, The Distinguished Service Cross, and the Medal of Honor.

While the number of decorations has remained static since WWII, the number of awards created for service has continued to rise. It is clear that while the numbers and types of operations and campaigns increased, the types of decoration for specific actions have remained consistent. In effect, the Army has continued to add service medals for the new campaigns fought since, for example, the Vietnam Service Medal and Kosovo Campaign medal. However, even after almost ten years of ‘a new type of war’ in places like Afghanistan, there has been no award incentive created that calls for and recognizes actions soldiers should take in a counterinsurgency environment.

Building Award Criteria for Afghanistan

This is a new kind of war for a new century George. I suppose this is the first time our enemies have not worn uniforms. Some are children and some are ...missionaries.

— Harry ‘Breaker’ Morant³⁹

There is an enduring, yet false, assertion that the conflict in Afghanistan represents some new type of war. Those who make it ignore a century’s worth of small wars. At least since the British experience in South Africa at the start of the 20th century, a large amount of text describes the theory behind insurgent/counterinsurgent warfare. While much of this theory existed it had been purged from the U.S. Army after the Vietnam War. Events in Afghanistan demonstrate that, although counterinsurgency was not new, the U.S. Army had forgotten many lessons previously learned. The institution turned to theorists to develop doctrine for this supposed ‘new’ type of war, the most prominent was a French Army officer.⁴⁰

David Galula was a French Army Officer who wrote *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, published in 1964. In the text, he draws on his experience in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria. He captures the different nature of an insurgency as compared with state-on-state conflict by referencing comments from a Chinese communist general, “A revolutionary war is twenty percent military action and eighty percent political.” Galula credits this axiom with being a formula that reflects the truth as he experienced it, and emphasizes in his writings the need for a civilian, versus

³⁹ *Breaker Morant*, Directed by Bruce Beresford, Performed by Edward Woodward, 1980.

⁴⁰ Even the title of first official history of the U.S. Army in Afghanistan captures this. See *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM* October 2001-September 2005 by Dr Donald P. Wright, CSI Press, 2010.

military, approach to counterinsurgency.⁴¹ When describing the importance of this civil authority, he adds, “The inescapable conclusion is that the over-all responsibility should stay with the civilian power at every possible level.”⁴² A further passage, worth quoting at length, seems prescient in describing Galula’s thoughts on counterinsurgency and awards:

Reflexes and decisions that would be considered appropriate for the soldier in conventional warfare and for the civil servant in normal times are not necessarily the right ones in counterinsurgency situations. A soldier fired upon in conventional war who does not fire back with every available weapon would be guilty of a dereliction of his duty; the reverse would be the case in counterinsurgency warfare, where the rule is to apply the minimum of fire. ‘No politics’ is an ingrained reaction for the conventional soldier, whose job is solely to defeat the enemy; yet in counterinsurgency warfare, the soldier’s job is to help win the support of the population, and in so doing, he has to engage in practical politics. A system of military awards and promotion, such as that in conventional warfare, which would encourage soldiers to kill or capture the largest numbers of enemies, and thus induce him to increase the scope and the frequency of his military operations, may well be disastrous in counterinsurgency warfare.⁴³

To summarize Galula, the preponderance of action should *not* involve military force; however, the military must be prepared to execute non-traditional tasks if a ready and trained civilian force is unavailable. Galula’s conceptual framework, created in the 1960’s would influence American doctrine writing in the new century as the US Army tried to Capture this theory and turn it into a coherent doctrine.

⁴¹ David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 89.

⁴² Ibid., 94.

⁴³ David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 95.

After the Afghanistan invasion, the U.S. Army and the U.S. military as a whole have attempted to capture the lessons about counterinsurgency discussed above.⁴⁴ Army doctrine represents a body of thought about how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force. Essentially, doctrine establishes how the Army views the nature of operations.⁴⁵ This ‘body of thought’ began to change with the end of the Cold War. Since 1989, three revisions have been made to the Army’s capstone field manual, *FM 3-0 Operations*, and a change to the latest version was published in February 2011. These revisions and changes seek to adjust the Army to the ever-changing strategic and operational environment. Today the tasks asked of the Army differ greatly from those performed during the World Wars. The shift in doctrine, combined with the creation of specific counterinsurgency manuals, demonstrate that the Army changed its vision of the operational mission

The 2011 Change 1 of *FM 3-0, Operations*, state its intention to, “take advantage of a ‘Campaign of Learning’ across our Army to adapt our concepts, doctrine, and processes more frequently than in the past.”⁴⁶ The change is significant because it begins to explore the tension that exists within the Army concerning where the preponderance of effort is placed. General Dempsey comments on deleting the spectrum of conflict chart:

For a time, it contributed to our understanding of full-spectrum operations. However, it inadvertently established a false dichotomy regarding whether we must prepare for

⁴⁴ The examples discussed here are, of course just a small sampling.

⁴⁵ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-0 Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), D-1.

⁴⁶ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-0 Operations Change 1* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), Foreword

irregular warfare or for major combat operations. In the next revision of FM 3-0, we will sharpen our language regarding full-spectrum operations. We will emphasize our Army's capability to conduct both combined arms maneuver and wide area security—the former necessary to gain the initiative and the latter necessary to consolidate gains and set conditions for stability operations, security force assistance and reconstruction. We must be capable of both and often simultaneously.⁴⁷

Additionally, Change 1 introduced the concept of mission command and Army design methodology.⁴⁸ A reoccurring theme in both concepts is adaptability. Lieutenant General Caslen writes in *Military Review*, “Leaders and forces base their adaptability on critical thinking, their comfort with ambiguity, their willingness to accept prudent risk, and their ability to adjust to a continuously evolving environment.”⁴⁹

Published in 2006, FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* brought doctrine the attempted to explain the actions needed in Afghanistan. The new manual, released under the auspices of General David Petraeus, who would eventually take over the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan received wide acceptance. In the forward to the manual is the following passage.

Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ A graphic visually depicting Mission Command is contained in the Appendix.

⁴⁹ Robert L. Caslen, "Change 1 to Field Manual 3-0: The Way the Army Fights Today." (*Military Review*, March-April 2011), 86

intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies.⁵⁰

Notable is the establishment of the dual purpose, warrior and nation builder. As seen above, there are multiple award incentives for being a warrior, but few for nation building.

FM 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, released in 2009 expanded on the earlier work of FM 3-24. It represents continued effort to codify doctrine and institutionalize it within the force. It is significant because it takes the conceptual based 3-24 and brings forward- tactics, techniques, and procedures executable by the platoons and companies. The quote below amplifies the warrior and nation building aspect a soldier must embody.

This armed struggle also involves eliminating insurgents who threaten the safety and security of the population. However military units alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Most of the work involves discovering and solving the population's underlying issues, that is, the root causes of their dissatisfaction with the current arrangement of political power. Dealing with diverse issues such as land reform, unemployment, oppressive leadership or ethical tensions places a premium on tactical leaders who can not only close with the enemy, but also negotiate agreements, operate with nonmilitary agencies and other nations, restore basic services, speak the native (a foreign) language, orchestrate political deals , and get the 'word' on the street.⁵¹

Also worth noting is the emphasis placed upon working with foreign partners. This emphasis on partnering is also reinforced by other institutions, such as the Combat

⁵⁰ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), Foreward.

⁵¹ Ibid., ix.

Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, which published *OP 19 Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present* in 2006.

Upon taking command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus issued COMISAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance. It contained 24 maxims distilling his thoughts. One of the maxims is reproduced here:

Consult and build relationships, but not just with those who seek us out. Earn the people's trust, talk to them, ask them questions and learn about their lives. Inquire about social dynamics, frictions, local histories, and grievances. Hear what they say. Be aware of others in the room and how their presence may affect the answers you get. Cross-check information and make sure you have the full story. Avoid knee-jerk responses based on first impressions. Don't be a pawn in someone else's game. Spend time, listen, consult and drink lots of tea⁵²

In effect, this guidance can be a criteria list, focusing on action that the commander, using the art and science described in mission, has deemed critical for mission accomplishment. The 24 maximums are broken down in the following table. It is clear that the award system as it stands today supports some. Certainly, the valor awards are the perfect tool for recognizing individuals who 'pursue the enemy relentlessly'. Less certain is the award system to incentivize some of the other points the commander deems important. It is logical to assume that given a set number of criteria, the criteria, which soldiers perceive linked with awards, would receive more attention and effort than criteria with no extrinsic reward association. In effect, awards could be acting as a screening methodology used by soldiers as they decide how to spend their limited time and resources conducting operations.

⁵²Petraeus, David H. "COMSAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance." (afghancoin.harmonieweb.org. August 1, 2010. <https://afghancoin.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Announcements/DispForm.aspx?ID=7&Source=https%3A%2F%2Fafghancoin%2Eharmonieweb%2Eorg%Fdefault%2Easpx> accessed May 16, 2011), 2.

COMISAF GUIDANCE AUGUST 2010		
Key Point	Can Award System Impact?	Comment
Secure and serve the population	Yes	
Live among the people	Yes	
Help confront the culture of impunity	Unclear	
Help Afghans build accountable governance	Unclear	
Pursue the enemy relentlessly	Yes	Clearly the strong point!
Fight hard and fight with discipline	Yes	Very strong
Identify corrupt officials	Unclear	
Hold what we secure	Yes	
Foster lasting solutions	Yes	Within one year windows
Money is ammunition; don't put it in the wrong hands	Unclear	
Be a good guest	Unclear	
Consult and build relationships, but not just with those who seek us out	Unclear	Hard to quantify a relationship
Walk	Yes	
Act as one team	Yes	
Partner with the ANSF	Yes	Ought to reflect in award narrative
Promote local reintegration	Yes	
Be first with the truth	Unclear	
Fight the information war aggressively	Unclear	
Manage expectations	No	
Live our values	Yes	
Maintain continuity through unit transitions	Unclear	
Empower subordinates	Yes	
Win the battle of wits	Yes	
Exercise initiative	Yes	

Table 2 COMISAF Counterinsurgent Guidance

All of the above examples convey the evolution of Army doctrine pertaining to counterinsurgency, which, driven by experience in places like Afghanistan and continues to this day. Counterinsurgency is no longer an afterthought, but a major focus of the Army. From the capstone documents that provide the overview and framework to those that outline more detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures, an incredible amount of energy was invested in helping the force learn how to operate more effectively in a counterinsurgency. In many ways, the actions necessary to be successful in a counterinsurgency campaign are diametrically opposed to those needed to win a conventional one. Uncomfortably, actions, which are vital for success in one type of

warfare produce counterproductive results if applied to another. One example of this has been night raids conducted in Afghanistan. These raids, designed to capture or kill Taliban insurgents were productive and resulted in over 3,000 insurgents killed or captured.⁵³ However, they came with significant political fallout, with the President of Afghanistan stating, “The Afghan people do not like these raids. If there is any raid, it has to be done by the Afghan government, within the Afghan laws.”⁵⁴ The table below highlights these differences in a simplified way.⁵⁵

COMPARING CONVENTIONAL WAR WITH COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR	
Conventional War Model	Counterinsurgency War Model
Direct	Indirect
Destroy the enemy to control the population	Control the population to destroy the enemy
Focused on a physical decisive point	Distributed to control political space, not a war of points
Discreet	Continuous
Unilateral	Multilateral by, with, and through
Maximum force	Minimum force
Top Down, focused on enemy leaders	Bottom up low level operations focused on the village or neighborhood

Table 3 Comparing Conventional war with Counterinsurgency

Examining the chart while remembering how the Army’s award system developed makes clear that the award system supports a conventional war model. In other words,

⁵³ Shanker, Thom, Elizabeth Bumiller, and Rod Nordland. "Despite Gains, Night Raids Split U.S. and Karzai." (New York Times .com. November 16, 2001. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/world/asia/16night.html> accessed May 16, 2011).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ This chart is the result of notes taken during a class titled Guerrilla Warfare taken at the Naval Postgraduate School in January 2008 taught by Dr Gordon McCormick and synthesis of several readings and discussions on counterinsurgency at the School of Advanced Military Science.

during the high intensity, state-on-state conflict characterized by the World Wars, awards and incentives that reinforced a conventional war model made sense and became engrained within the Army system. When fighting a conventional war this made perfect sense. However, as shown, Army doctrine has changed dramatically to reflect recent experience. The awards system has not. The effect is that the Army pulled in two different directions. The World Wars continue to influence the Army's corporate identity and form the frame of reference for awards, while new counterinsurgency theory and doctrine demand a different set of rewards. The design of the pyramid of honor and the extent to which it has remained unchanged is one indication of how entrenched this corporate identity is.

This begs the question: "If the Army has embraced counterinsurgency thought and doctrine, do the awards earned in Afghanistan reflect this change?" To answer that question, the Silver Star is used.

Analysis of Awards in Afghanistan

This monograph uses the Silver Star to examine the types of actions rewarded in Afghanistan. As of October 29, 2010, the Army had awarded 195 Silver Stars for actions in Afghanistan.⁵⁶ It is a significant award because in most circumstances the approval authority resides above the Division Commander at the Lieutenant General level. In Afghanistan, that is the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command. This general officer oversees the daily operations throughout the country. Enough presentations of The Silver Star exist so that analysis is possible.⁵⁷

The website Hall of Heroes has a database that contains synopses along with certificates and citations of the awards earned by American service members.⁵⁸ The section that covers Silver Stars for the Global War on Terror contains data on 168 of the 194 Silver Stars awarded in Afghanistan.⁵⁹ The author analyzed these records according to several different variables, shown in Figure 2 below. Most of these variables are

⁵⁶ U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Military Awards Branch, "Statistics by Region, Conflict or Incident," www.hrc.army.mil, April 22, 2009, https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/awards/STATS/Jan_07_MAB_Statistics_Conflict%2c_Operation%2c_or_Incident.doc (accessed February 4, 2011), 2.

⁵⁷ The Silver Star is the third highest valor award. Only five Medals of Honor have been awarded to soldiers since 9/11 for actions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, SFC Paul Smith, PFC Ross McGinnis, SSG Millerand and SFC Monti were posthumous. SSG Salvatore Guinta was the first living recipient of the award since Vietnam. Only five have earned the Distinguished Service Cross in Afghanistan, not lending to significant analysis.

⁵⁸ The Appendix shows an example of the type of information contained in each record.

⁵⁹ This site has compiled the citations and narratives of Silver Star recipients from open sources and by direct requests to the recipients. The sample used here, some 86% of the total Silver Stars awarded in Afghanistan, is a fair representation of Silver Star awardees. It is possible, but unlikely, that, for whatever reason, the 14% of Silver Star recipients not included in this database reflect a higher level of partnering/advising. It is possible that there are instances of Silver Stars awarded to members of Army Special Operations Command or other commands that were not publically released.

straightforward and self-explanatory. However, to clearly answer the question, “Was the service member advising or partnering?” the author often had to make a judgment call and defaulted to defining advising and partnering as broadly as possible. Remembering the dichotomy presented above between the conventional and unconventional model this question was the best metric available to determine that the service member was following counterinsurgency doctrine. Where the recipient is a member of a Military Transition Team the designation is clear. In other cases, if there was any mention of Host Nation forces participating in or around the action, in any way, the author coded this as advising or partnering.

Demographics for Silver Star Recipients				
Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Date of Event	Gender of Service Member
Did the action occur in base defense?	Was the service member killed in the event?	Was the service member wounded in the event?	Was the service member Advising or Partnering?	Was the service member Special Forces?

Figure 2 Silver Star recipient demographics

It would not be useful to this study if either all the records occurred very early or very recently in the timeline. Shown in the figure below, the data set spreads across the time horizon for the Afghanistan conflict.




Figure 3 Number of Afghan Silver Star records by year

In some ways, this figure may just be graphically showing the evolution of the conflict in Afghanistan. Success and mopping up operations in 2002 and 2003 produced significant action, followed by a period where much of the focus was on Iraq in 2003 to 2006 then, a resurgence of Taliban forces and renewed interest in the fight by the Army and nation at large.

The data reveals some interesting things about the Silver Star and Afghanistan and is show in the figure below. The most salient point is that less than 40% of the recipients of the Silver Star were partnering or advising Afghan forces when they earned the decoration.

however ancillary, with Afghan forces. This discrepancy is at the heart of the issue, the awards system does not support counterinsurgency doctrine or incentivize action on the ground in Afghanistan congruent with the doctrine. If anything the data suggest that the awards system is driving the types of behavior that is more consistent with high intensity state-on state warfare and with a focus on the enemy rather than the population or building host nation institutions.




Figure 5. Number of Silver Stars awarded in OEF

A new trend developed in 2007 with the Silver Star awarded for actions taken while defending forward operating bases or combat outposts. Before 2007, no records for awards for actions relating to a static base defense exist. One such event occurred in the village of Wanat in 2008 and resulted in multiple awards for the defenders. It provides a case study of awards and incentives in Afghanistan, and drives home some of the points made above.

Afghanistan Case Study: Wanat and the Aftermath

For us, the captains in these wars which we could only lose, the hated defenders of a bourgeois order which indulges in the luxury of a clean conscience while obliging us to protect its privileges, there was nothing left but to die or disappear, for we had ceased being useful and were becoming dangerous.

—Captain Phillipe Esclavier⁶⁰

The Event

In early July of 2008, a company of US Army infantrymen in Afghanistan received the following mission statement for Operation Rock Move:

ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) and C/2-503 conducts air movement and ground assault convoy from 8-10 JULY 2008 to realign US and ANA forces in Nuristan Province IOT deny freedom of movement and consolidate US forces for upcoming RIP[relief in place] with 1-26 IN.⁶¹

This company had operated for over a year within the Waygal River valley. It closed one outpost further up the valley called the Ranch House and was in the process of closing a second, called Bella, in conjunction with the establishment of a new combat outpost (COP) in the village of Wanat. This operation was called ROCK MOVE. .⁶² Wanat was the District Center and the Afghan National Police Headquarters for the area and was accessible by road, something the COPs further up the valley were not. Moving an outpost to Wanat was consistent with counterinsurgency doctrine, and it made tactical

⁶⁰ Jean Larteguy. *The Praetorians*. Translated by Xan Fielding. (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 1963), 306.

⁶¹ Enclosure 29 to US Central Command (CENTCOM). "Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 11.

⁶² US Army Combat Studies Institute. *Wanat Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 71.

sense to establish the site prior to a new unit's arrival.⁶³ Between 9 and 12 July. LT Brostrum, the 2nd platoon leader built the outpost., On 12 July, Captain Myer, the company commander, assumed command of the effort, which now also included an Afghan National Army platoon with US Marine Corps advisors. Just before dawn the next morning, the enemy attacked Myer's command. The augmented platoon successfully defended against an attack by a numerically superior enemy whose goal was to destroy the combined American and Afghan force. However, enemy forces killed nine U.S. soldiers during the defense, eight of whom were in a relatively exposed observation post. The resulting media attention refocused public awareness on the war in Afghanistan. The nine killed there were more than the seven killed at Roberts Ridge in March 2002. The incident immediately highlighted to the American people that not all was well in Afghanistan.

The Aftermath

There is no disputing that the soldiers who fought at Wanat did so with exceptional valor. The Army recognized their valor with 13 Silver Star medals, 23 Bronze Stars, and one pending recommendation for the Distinguished Service Cross⁶⁴ This is an amazing number of awards, for when the attack began there were 49 U.S. military personnel in Wanat.⁶⁵ At least 74% of the U.S. military personnel engaged in the fight earned decorations.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁶⁴ US Army Combat Studies Institute. *Wanat Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 200.

⁶⁵ US Central Command (CENTCOM). "Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008" (Redacted), 14.

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas studied the engagement at Wanat. An initial draft of the CSI report released to the press contained the following passages:

There was an absence of command involvement, and thus command influence, at Wanat by both TF Bayonet and CJTF-101 from 9 July until the ACM attack actually occurred early on the morning of 13 July. Whether or not such command interest could have resolved the challenges that the establishment of COP Kahler faced or in some manner altered the course of events, is, of course speculative. But senior US Army leadership failed to positively influence events at Wanat.⁶⁶

This draft, picked up by media outlets, drove a series of official re investigations.

Investigations and Analysis

General David Petraeus appointed Lieutenant General Richard Natonski, USMC, to conduct a re-investigation into the combat action at Wanat on 24 September 2009.⁶⁷ The result was a massive report, the supporting appendixes spanned over five-thousand pages. Natonski's opinions were consistent with the draft CSI report. Three of the sharpest rebukes read as follows:

That LTC Ostland (the Battalion Commander) was through neglect, derelict in the performance of his duty to properly oversee the planning and execution of Operation Rock

⁶⁶ US Army Combat Studies Institute "Wanat OP- REVISED DRAFT" 25 June 2009 (2)." stltoday.com. January 10, 2011. <http://images.stltoday.com/stltoday/resources/wanatop.pdf> (accessed January 10, 2011), 195.

⁶⁷ Enclosure one to US Central Command (CENTCOM). "Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008" (Redacted).

Move and the subsequent construction of the COP at Wanat.⁶⁸

That CPT Myer (the Company Commander) was through neglect, derelict in the performance of his duty to conduct detailed planning for Chosen Company's role in the establishment of the COP at Wanat and in his duty to provide guidance support and supervision to his subordinates during the establishment of the COP at Wanat⁶⁹

That had the Battalion Commander, Battalion Staff, or Company commander properly prioritized their efforts in support of the Battalions main effort and visited Wanat prior to 12 July 2008. They would likely have identified OP Topside's vulnerabilities and other resource shortfalls at the position.⁷⁰

Acting upon the recommendations of the 12 July 2010 LTG Natonski report, General David Petraeus issued letters of reprimand to Meyer, Ostland, and the Brigade Commander, Colonel Preysler. The officers appealed these letters of reprimand to the Forces Command (FORSCOM) Commander General Charles Campbell, who ordered another investigation.

On 13 May 2010, General Campbell published his report, almost two years after the engagement. The report vindicated Meyer, Ostland, and Preysler and declared the action at Wanat a victory. On the first page, Campbell's report states.

At the outset, I wish to pay my own tribute to the officers, noncommissioned officers, Soldiers, and Marines stationed at Combat Outpost (COP) Kahler (Wanat) who repelled the attack of a superior enemy force consisting of approximately 200 fighters on 13 July 2008. During heroic fighting, leadership, combat skills, discipline, and esprit de

⁶⁸ US Central Command (CENTCOM). "Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008" (Redacted), 57.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 58

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 60

corps ensured the successful defense of the COP and a tactical victory.⁷¹

The general also rescinded the letters of reprimand for the three officers commanding the company, battalion, and brigade involved at Wanat. He informed the families of those soldiers killed at Wanat that there would be no punishment for those LTG Natonski had found to be negligent. His written report concludes, "Battle is the supreme test of any unit...That U.S. Casualties occurred at Wanat is true. However, they did not occur as a result of deficient decisions, planning, and actions of the chain of command...In war, battle is the mechanism by which we defeat the enemy. In battle, casualties are inevitable."

The Combat Studies Institute final report, *Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008*, in December 2010 contained revisions from earlier drafts that had been leaked to the media. The earlier draft contained themes similar to LTG Nakonski's report, the final history, however, was most critical of platoon leader, 1LT Johnathan Brostrom, stating, "The placement of the Observation Post is perhaps the most important factor contributing to the course of the engagement at Wanat".⁷² Thus, in the end, LT Bronstrom, posthumously awarded the Silver Star for his valor was also pinned with the lion's share of the blame for those who died.

In an article published after the 2d Battalion-503 Parachute Infantry Regiment's tour, the commander, LTC Ostland stated, "Soldiers spent 90% of their time conducting

⁷¹ US Central Command (CENTCOM). "Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008" (Redacted), 1.

⁷² Greg Jaffe, "Army edits its history of the deadly battle of Wanat." Washingtonpost.com. December 28, 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/28/AR2010122804334.html> (accessed December 28, 2010).

nonlethal counterinsurgency actions intended to train the Afghan National Security Forces, connect the population to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and improve the infrastructure throughout the area – a mere 10% of time was spent on lethal activity.”⁷³ This statement supports the idea that the unit was in line with counterinsurgency doctrine. However, Ostland also provides a final analysis in the article, stating that his battalion was involved in over 1000 enemy contacts. These contacts, during which over 36,000 rounds of indirect fire were expended, resulted in twenty-six soldiers of the battalion killed in action and 143 wounded. Three soldiers were nominated for the Medal of Honor (SSG Salvatore Giunta’s was approved); one Distinguished Service Cross was approved with one pending; 25 Silver Stars and over 300 Army Commendation Medals with Valor were awarded.⁷⁴ It an attempt to provide some type of comparison, 1-24 Infantry Battalion, operating in Northern Iraq in 2004 to 2005 had more soldiers wounded (181 Purple Hearts) , yet awarded only five Silver Stars and 31 Bronze Stars for Valor.⁷⁵his final analysis flies in the face of the 90% non-lethal counterinsurgency actions statement. This is not written to be disparaging of the 2nd Battalion, 503 PIR, only to raise the point of discussion that the leadership had the tools available through the Army award system to reward soldiers in a concrete and visible manner for kinetic actions against the enemy. These actions were celebrated with award ceremonies, the medals symbolized the sacrifices made by those who lost their lives. However, nowhere to be found is the celebration and honoring of the 90% non-lethal

⁷³ William B Ostland, "Tactical Leader Lessons Learned in Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom VIII." (*Military Review*, July-August 2009), 2.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷⁵ William G Robertson. *In Contact! Case Studies from the Long War* Volume I. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.

counterinsurgency actions. The narratives matter, and in this case what soldiers see rewarded appears to be different from the non-lethal narrative.

Awards recognize meritorious actions and acclaim the actions as examples to emulate. Punishments, then, point out actions that are deemed to be unacceptable and, thus, serve to discourage similar ones. In the end, only the awards, the incentives, not the punishments, the disincentives remained. It is vital to remember that the award and punishment process does not occur in a vacuum. The perception that soldiers in Wanat and elsewhere in Afghanistan should be celebrated for their actions in battle instead of their actions to implement counterinsurgency doctrine is a message with much broader effects than those revolving around conclusions of the Wanat investigation itself or any assessment of the activities of the 2nd Battalion, 503 PIR during its deployment.

There is a saying that a unit will only do well that which a leader inspects. A unit may also only excel at those things that leaders reward. In the end this may be the more important conclusion—that a unit where the value of valor is so highly regarded and awarded there remains little, if any, room for actions which, although called for in doctrine, are not rewarded. Who is a young NCO or company grade officer going to want to emulate. The man who has spent weeks or months working with the population little tangible to show for it, or the man whose combat actions brought him public acclaim and tangible, enduring symbols of his prowess? Clearly, the latter. Are there new awards that may help future leaders in Afghanistan reward the types of behavior necessary for success in counterinsurgency as well as those so key to success in combat?

Recent Developments with Awards in Afghanistan

Courageous Restraint

The preceding chapters focused on the power of extrinsic rewards, how a high intensity warfare paradigm influenced the Army's award system, and how awards received in Afghanistan do not necessarily reflect the actions called for by counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. Have leaders and headquarters within the military taken any positive action to align awards with actions necessary in a counterinsurgency? The answer is yes, but the efforts have not been successful.

The International Security Assistance Force Headquarters (ISAF) proposed honoring 'courageous restraint' in April 2010, the comments released by that headquarters at the time bear repeating at length:

We routinely and systematically recognize valor, courage and effectiveness during kinetic combat operations. Afghan and coalition forces alike understand that most medals and formal recognition currently come from effective actions during fierce combat. In a COIN campaign, however, it is critical to also recognize that sometimes the most effective bullet is the bullet not fired. I would like to offer for your consideration a paradigm in which we could actively seek to learn from our Afghan partners and our deployed task forces about specific instances and examples of Courageous Restraint on the battlefield. There should be an opportunity to recognize and celebrate the troops who exhibit extraordinary courage and self-control by not using their weapons, but instead taking personal risk to de-escalate tense and potentially disastrous situations. Our goal is to earn the faith and the trust of the Afghan people. We believe honoring Courageous Restraint is an important way to support that goal.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ International Security Assistance Force. "Honoring Courageous Restraint." *isaf.nato.int*. April 30, 2010. <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/caat-analysis-news/honoring-courageous-restraint.html> (accessed November 30, 2010) 1-2

This passage makes clear that members of ISAF used both theory and doctrine to ascertain what actions are key to success in counterinsurgency. Much of the wording of the statement comes off as lifted from the theorists discussed in the previous chapters. Yet the response to this proposal was almost entirely negative even though its premise is entirely consistent with both reward theory and counterinsurgency doctrine. Media pundits like Rush Limbaugh piled on, stating, “This would be the Yellow Heart medal!”⁷⁷ Overshadowed by the outrage that soldiers could be honored for actions other than kinetic, one veteran Marine Corps officer said, “this key tenet of counterinsurgency [courageous restraint] has not been internalized across the rank and file, even after all of our setbacks in Iraq, Afghanistan *and* Vietnam. It seems mightily unlikely that true understanding of courageous restraint will suddenly sink in anytime soon.”⁷⁸ This is the challenge—actions so necessary in conventional war are diametrically opposed to those needed in a counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, all of the bias in both the Army and society line up in support of actions, which are expressly in conflict with current counterinsurgency doctrine.

Combat Army Achievement Medal with V Device

Small units are the building blocks of armies. In World War II, squads, platoons and companies were massed into Divisions, then Corps, and, finally, Armies and Army Groups. These large units commanded by General Officers, who at the Corps level were

⁷⁷ Rush Limbaugh, "Medal for "Courageous Restraint" ([www.rushlimbaugh.com](http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_051210/content/0112515.guest.html). May 12, 2010. http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_051210/content/0112515.guest.html accessed April 20, 2011).

⁷⁸ Jason Lemieux “No, Really: Is the US Military Cut Out For Courageous Restraint?” ([smallwarsjournal.com](http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/481-lemieux.pdf). July 29, 2009. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/481-lemieux.pdf> accessed January 5, 2011).

between 47 and 61 years old, fought their way across Europe, the Pacific, and Asia to defeat the Axis powers.⁷⁹ Approval for awards was, like most bureaucratic functions, consolidated at higher levels. Counterinsurgency is a low-level operation. Platoons and companies are the units of action, not the massed Divisions and Corps. So, too, are decentralized execution and individual initiative arguably more important in a COIN fight. It would be logical to think that the Army would take steps to adjust the approval authorities or process to support success in the counterinsurgent conflict. However, a look at the some of the lowest awards on the pyramid of valor shows another disconnect.

The Army Commendation Medal (ARCOM) is the lowest level award for combat related actions. This award is approved by a brigade commander, usually a full Colonel. A soldier would be recommended by his platoon leader, then have the form endorsed by the company and battalion commander before going to the approval authority at the brigade. The Army Achievement Medal (AAM) can be approved by a battalion commander but it is not authorized for acts related to combat operations. Recognizing this, 3rd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division proposed changing the regulation in 2007 to allow an AAM with V device (denoting that it was earned for actions in combat). This would give the battalion-level commander supervising the companies intimately involved in low-level operations in villages and neighborhoods an award tool that he or she could approve.⁸⁰ This action could be implemented with minimal cost as both the award and

⁷⁹ Robert H. Berlin, *U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1989), 4.

⁸⁰ A copy of the memorandum is in the Appendix. Endorsed by the chain of command in Iraq, Human Resource Command subsequently disapproved the request.

‘V’ device are already readily available. It was not approved and the Brigade level-commander remains the approval authority for valor awards.

There remains no award specifically recognizing outstanding achievement in non-kinetic actions vital to counterinsurgency. Brigade commanders remain the approval authority for the lowest level award in theater. The army has faced and will continue to face a ‘different’ type of war in Afghanistan. It will likely face similar types of operations elsewhere in the future. It remains to be seen if it can structure extrinsic incentives, specifically its award system to meet the challenges of these operations. There is one award which has changed to recognize the realities of the conflict in Afghanistan, the oldest in the Army—the Purple Heart.

The Purple Heart

The two examples above have shown areas where elements of the operational force have identified a divergence between awards and doctrine and recommended changes only to have no results. The Purple Heart, our oldest decoration has been entitlement criteria refined, reflecting the realities of warfare in its current context. Almost 25,000 soldiers have been awarded Purple Hearts for wounds suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁸¹ The wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq have differed from those in the past by the number of soldiers injured, but not killed by blasts. The result being about 90,000 soldiers have sustained mild traumatic brain injuries since 2002.⁸² Regulations

⁸¹ Christian T. Miller and Daniel Zwerdling. "Army Clarifies Purple Heart Rules For Soldiers." (www.npr.org. March 17, 2011. <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/17/134604533/army-revising-purple-heart-rules-for-soldiers> accessed March 17, 2011). 1

⁸² Christian T. Miller and Daniel Zwerdling "Purple Hearts Elusive For Traumaic Brain Injuries." (www.npr.org. September 9, 2010. <http://www.npr.org/2010/09/09/129606127/purple-hearts-elusive-for-traumatic-brain-injuries> accessed March 17, 2011). 4

state that a soldier is entitled to the Purple Heart if injured by hostile action, yet traumatic brain injuries (TBI) were 'hidden' wounds. The Vice-Chief of Staff, General Peter Chiarelli provided updated guidance to the force in 2011, reminding commanders that the concussions associated with TBI were grounds for the award. Chiarelli acknowledged the power that the Purple Heart has to service members, and the importance in recognizing those wounded in ways that are not always visible. He reminded all that the Purple Heart "shows to everyone that these hidden injuries are truly injuries that affect folks."⁸³

The most senior leaders of the Army acknowledge that the experiences of soldiers in our current wars are different from those faced in past wars. The clarification of the criteria for the Purple Heart demonstrates this. However, the evidence presented above suggests much more needs to be done. The award system should be adjusted to provide an incentive structure aligned with doctrine. Only then will a complete framework of extrinsic motivators exist to produce the results desired. The Army does not get to choose the fight. Elected civilian leaders have that responsibility. However, the Army can choose if and how it adapts to the circumstances it finds itself in. Today, the Army must develop appropriate incentives for soldiers to reward the types of actions needed to produce a better peace.

⁸³ Christian T. Miller and Daniel Zwerdling. "Army Clarifies Purple Heart Rules For Soldiers." (www.npr.org. March 17, 2011. <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/17/134604533/army-revising-purple-heart-rules-for-soldiers> accessed March 17, 2011). 2

Conclusions and Recommendations

This study began with a quote from Stephen Levett, discussing how “incentives are the cornerstone of modern life”.⁸⁴ It seems clear that, in a broad sense, the Army is incentivizing, through its Awards system in the same manner and for the same actions it did in World War II. The young soldiers who interact daily with the people of Afghanistan will most likely be unfamiliar with all the conceptual and detailed components of the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. However, they will be quick notice who around them is receiving awards, and they know and remember what those individuals did to earn them. It is folly to think that soldiers will consistently perform the actions necessary to execute counterinsurgency doctrine successfully when they see those around them rewarded for something else. Looking at awards and what they incentivize, one could conclude that the Army is not practicing the adaptably emphasized by the new Chief of Staff and incentivizing actions congruent to World War Two rather than Afghanistan in 2011.

This monograph demonstrates the importance of rewards to individuals and organizations. Extrinsic rewards, such as pay, promotion, and awards are tools that can be used to reinforce desired behavior and norms. This said, awards remain the tool with the most possibilities for rewarding behavior due to current operations and requirements on the force. The current award system built primarily during the World Wars to support actions that large-scale high intensity combat required. Army doctrine and the experiences of soldiers on the ground since 2001 show a type of warfare very different than that in existence when the award system was built. New doctrine emphasizes

⁸⁴ Steven D. Levitt, *Freakonomics* (HarperCollins, New York 2005). 11

counterinsurgency, which requires soldiers to perform actions different than and often the opposite to those needed during the World Wars. An analysis of the Silver Star Medals awarded in Afghanistan shows that, although there has been improvement, the majority of these valor awards go to soldiers who are not doing the very basic tenet of counterinsurgency doctrine, working by with and through the host nation. Using a case study of combat actions at Wanat, the actions needed to kill the enemy were more highly valued and rewarded than established counterinsurgency tactics. When attempts to modify decorations to support new doctrine have been attempted, they have been shot down with the exception of the Purple Heart entitlement.

Multiple areas for future study exist:

More thought and study ought to put into the creation of an achievement award that recognizes excellence in counterinsurgency. The courageous restraint medal attempted to fill this void, perhaps presented a different way and backed by a senior army, or even civilian leader it would have a better chance of success. Options could be similar to the Army Achievement Medal, and presented in designated areas by Battalion level commanders. A four star commander ought to have the tools available to incentivize a wide range of actions. The ISAF commander listed 24 priorities in his counterinsurgency guidance. Adaptability, key to mission command ought to exist in the awards system as well. Can awards that incentivize the commander's guidance for the specific conditions in Afghanistan not be either created or modified from the existing menu? The ISAF commander has made clear his counterinsurgency priorities in published guidance, reviewing even a small percentage of the narratives that are

accompanying award submissions could be a valuable path for feedback to the commander. Providing insight on how soldiers are acting upon the guidance.

The Army ought to examine the promotion incentive again. If, and with the introduction of military force in Libya in March 2011 it is a large if, the global requirements on the Army are reduced, the need for officers at all ranks will correspondingly decrease. That combined with increased accessions since 2001 ought to increase the eligible pool of promotable officers to the point where supply exceeds demand. At that point the Army can make a deliberate decision to provide instruction to the board to add weight to officers whose files include partnering or advising jobs over those without that experience.

Creating pay for performance would be a challenging matter. Trying to impose some sort of equity within the system would be nearly impossible across a theater as large as Afghanistan. Perhaps the best use of incentive pay with regard to counterinsurgency is by continuing, or perhaps even increasing special pay for soldiers who display proficiency in needed languages. It seems that if significant monetary rewards had been offered to soldiers who became proficient in Dari or Pashto early in the war a significant capability may exist now.

The narratives that accompany awards matter. Although the award recognizes an individual, the circumstances surrounding the event matter even more in a counterinsurgency, mention should be made of the host nation forces, even if they played a relatively minor role. Further study may well find that in some of the awards included in this database, the soldier was actually working with Afghan forces, yet the individual who was writing the award or narrative did not think it important to include that fact.

This could expose how within the force, exactly how deep counterinsurgency doctrine has not penetrated!

There needs to be clear consistent communication from leaders, specifically at Battalion and Brigade level, about what types of actions they think are important in counterinsurgency. Awards are an issue and process that requires commanders and all leaders to stop and think before acting. Every action could have unintended consequences. In Afghanistan, a commander may very well need to have the ability to incentive traditional warrior actions in one valley and nation building counterinsurgency actions in the next. Doctrine is commander centric, and commanders must enforce and reinforce actions from their soldiers that will accomplish the required objective. The Army must have a dialog with these commanders to ensure they have the incentive tools to accomplish the mission.

None of the above suggests that valor, and the Army awards that recognize it are not important. As long as there is war, and there certainly does not seem to be any shortage of it, the sons and daughters of America will need to demonstrate courage on the field of battle in the face of a thinking adapting and lethal enemy. It is time however to realize that warfare differs as to time, place, and circumstance. In Afghanistan, the conflict requires a set of award incentives that differs from those of our past and is contingent on the context of the conflict. Operational adaptability is something the Army has stated it must increase, the Chief of Staff made this clear in Change 1 to FM 3-0. The Army's award system, which provides incentives to the young soldiers executing our national policy, must show the same adaptability in a new century of conflict

Appendices

Appendix 1 2011 Basic Pay Chart

BASIC PAY—EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2011											
Pay Grade	2 or less	Over 2	Over 3	Over 4	Over 5	Over 6	Over 8	Over 10	Over 12	Over 14	Over 16
O-10 ¹											
O-9 ¹											
O-8 ¹	9,530.70	9,842.70	10,050.00	10,107.90	10,366.50	10,798.20	10,899.00	11,308.80	11,426.40	11,779.80	12,291.00
O-7 ¹	7,919.10	8,287.20	8,457.30	8,592.80	8,837.70	9,079.80	9,359.70	9,638.70	9,918.80	10,798.20	11,540.70
O-6 ¹	5,869.50	6,448.50	6,871.50	6,871.50	6,897.60	7,193.40	7,232.40	7,232.40	7,643.40	8,370.30	8,798.90
O-5	4,893.00	5,512.20	5,893.80	5,965.80	6,203.70	6,346.20	6,659.40	6,889.20	7,186.20	7,640.70	7,856.70
O-4	4,221.90	4,887.30	5,213.40	5,286.00	5,588.70	5,913.30	6,317.40	6,632.10	6,851.10	6,976.50	7,049.10
O-3	3,711.90	4,208.10	4,542.00	4,951.80	5,188.80	5,449.20	5,617.80	5,894.70	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00
O-2	3,207.30	3,652.80	4,207.20	4,349.10	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50
O-1	2,784.00	2,897.40	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50
O-3 ¹				4,951.80	5,188.80	5,449.20	5,617.80	5,894.70	6,128.10	6,262.20	6,444.90
O-2 ¹				4,349.10	4,438.50	4,580.10	4,818.60	5,002.80	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20
O-1 ¹				3,502.50	3,740.40	3,878.70	4,020.30	4,158.90	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10
W-5											
W-4	3,836.10	4,126.50	4,245.00	4,361.40	4,562.10	4,760.70	4,961.40	5,264.40	5,529.60	5,781.90	5,988.30
W-3	3,502.80	3,648.90	3,798.80	3,847.80	4,004.70	4,313.70	4,635.00	4,786.20	4,961.10	5,142.00	5,466.00
W-2	3,099.90	3,393.00	3,483.30	3,545.40	3,746.40	4,059.00	4,213.50	4,366.20	4,552.50	4,698.00	4,830.00
W-1	2,721.00	3,013.50	3,092.40	3,258.90	3,456.00	3,745.80	3,881.40	4,070.40	4,256.70	4,403.10	4,538.10
E-9 ¹							4,634.70	4,739.70	4,872.00	5,027.70	5,184.60
E-8						3,794.10	3,961.80	4,065.60	4,190.40	4,325.10	4,568.40
E-7	2,637.30	2,878.50	2,988.90	3,135.00	3,249.00	3,444.60	3,554.70	3,750.90	3,913.50	4,024.50	4,143.00
E-6	2,281.20	2,510.10	2,620.80	2,728.50	2,840.70	3,093.60	3,192.30	3,382.80	3,441.00	3,483.60	3,533.40
E-5	2,090.10	2,230.20	2,337.90	2,448.30	2,620.20	2,800.50	2,947.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50
E-4	1,916.10	2,014.20	2,123.40	2,230.80	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90
E-3	1,729.80	1,838.70	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00
E-2	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90
E-1 ¹	1,467.80										

Notes:

1. Basic pay for an O-7 to O-10 is limited by Level II of the Executive Schedule which is \$14,975.10. Basic pay for O-6 and below is limited by Level V of the Executive Schedule which is \$12,141.60.
2. While serving as Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff/Vice Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, Chief of Navy Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Army/Air Force Chief of Staff, Commander of a unified or specified combatant command, basic pay is \$20,263.50. (See note 1 above).
3. Applicable to O-1 to O-3 with at least 4 years and 1 day of active duty or more than 1460 points as a warrant and/or enlisted member. See Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations for more detailed explanation on who is eligible for this special basic pay rate.
4. For the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, Chief Master Sergeant of the AF, Sergeant Major of the Army or Marine Corps or Senior Enlisted Advisor of the JCS, basic pay is \$7,499.80. Combat Zone Tax Exclusion for O-1 and above is based on this basic pay rate plus Hostile Fire Pay/Imminent Danger Pay which is \$225.00.
5. Applicable to E-1 with 4 months or more of active duty. Basic pay for an E-1 with less than 4 months of active duty is \$1,357.20.
6. Basic pay rate for Academy Cadets/Midshipmen and ROTC members/applicants is \$974.40.

Appendix 1 Continued

BASIC PAY—EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2011											
Pay Grade	Over 20	Over 22	Over 24	Over 26	Over 28	Over 30	Over 32	Over 34	Over 36	Over 38	Over 40
O-10 ¹	15,400.80	15,475.80	15,797.70	16,358.40	16,358.40	17,176.20	17,176.20	18,034.80	18,034.80	18,936.90	18,936.90
O-9 ¹	13,469.70	13,663.80	13,944.00	14,433.00	14,433.00	15,155.10	15,155.10	15,912.90	15,912.90	16,708.50	16,708.50
O-8 ¹	12,762.30	13,077.30	13,077.30	13,077.30	13,077.30	13,404.30	13,404.30	13,739.40	13,739.40	13,739.40	13,739.40
O-7 ¹	11,540.70	11,540.70	11,540.70	11,599.50	11,599.50	11,831.70	11,831.70	11,831.70	11,831.70	11,831.70	11,831.70
O-6 ¹	9,222.90	9,465.60	9,711.30	10,187.70	10,187.70	10,391.10	10,391.10	10,391.10	10,391.10	10,391.10	10,391.10
O-5	8,070.30	8,313.30	8,313.30	8,313.30	8,313.30	8,313.30	8,313.30	8,313.30	8,313.30	8,313.30	8,313.30
O-4	7,049.10	7,049.10	7,049.10	7,049.10	7,049.10	7,049.10	7,049.10	7,049.10	7,049.10	7,049.10	7,049.10
O-3	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00	6,039.00
O-2	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50	4,438.50
O-1	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50	3,502.50
O-3 ²	6,444.90	6,444.90	6,444.90	6,444.90	6,444.90	6,444.90	6,444.90	6,444.90	6,444.90	6,444.90	6,444.90
O-2 ²	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20	5,140.20
O-1 ²	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10	4,349.10
W-5	6,820.80	7,167.00	7,424.70	7,710.00	7,710.00	8,095.80	8,095.80	8,500.50	8,500.50	8,925.90	8,925.90
W-4	6,169.60	6,485.40	6,728.40	7,005.60	7,005.60	7,145.70	7,145.70	7,145.70	7,145.70	7,145.70	7,145.70
W-3	5,685.30	5,816.40	5,955.60	6,144.90	6,144.90	6,144.90	6,144.90	6,144.90	6,144.90	6,144.90	6,144.90
W-2	4,987.80	5,091.60	5,174.10	5,174.10	5,174.10	5,174.10	5,174.10	5,174.10	5,174.10	5,174.10	5,174.10
W-1	4,701.60	4,701.60	4,701.60	4,701.60	4,701.60	4,701.60	4,701.60	4,701.60	4,701.60	4,701.60	4,701.60
E-9 ³	5,436.60	5,649.30	5,873.40	6,215.70	6,215.70	6,526.20	6,526.20	6,852.90	6,852.90	7,195.80	7,195.80
E-8	4,691.70	4,901.70	5,017.80	5,304.60	5,304.60	5,411.10	5,411.10	5,411.10	5,411.10	5,411.10	5,411.10
E-7	4,189.20	4,342.80	4,425.60	4,740.00	4,740.00	4,740.00	4,740.00	4,740.00	4,740.00	4,740.00	4,740.00
E-6	3,533.40	3,533.40	3,533.40	3,533.40	3,533.40	3,533.40	3,533.40	3,533.40	3,533.40	3,533.40	3,533.40
E-5	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50	2,965.50
E-4	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90	2,325.90
E-3	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00	1,950.00
E-2	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90	1,644.90

Notes:

1. Basic pay for an O-7 to O-10 is limited by Level II of the Executive Schedule which is \$14,975.10. Basic pay for O-6 and below is limited by Level V of the Executive Schedule which is \$12,141.60.
2. While serving as Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff/Vice Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, Chief of Navy Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Army/Air Force Chief of Staff, Commander of a unified or specified combatant command, basic pay is \$20,263.50. (See note 1 above).
3. Applicable to O-1 to O-3 with at least 4 years and 1 day of active duty or more than 1460 points as a warrant and/or enlisted member. See Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations for more detailed explanation on who is eligible for this special basic pay rate.
4. For the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, Chief Master Sergeant of the AF, Sergeant Major of the Army or Marine Corps or Senior Enlisted Advisor of the JCS, basic pay is \$7,489.80. Combat Zone Tax Exclusion for O-1 and above is based on this basic pay rate plus Hostile Fire Pay/Imminent Danger Pay which is \$225.00.
5. Applicable to E-1 with 4 months or more of active duty. Basic pay for an E-1 with less than 4 months of active duty is \$1,357.20.
6. Basic pay rate for Academy Cadets/Midshipmen and ROTC members/applicants is \$974.40.

Appendix 2 Special Pay Incentives for Health Care Professionals

SPECIAL PAYS FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS									
Variable Special Pay (Medical Officers)									
Pay Grade	Under 3	3 But Less Than 6	6 But Less Than 8	8 But Less Than 10	10 But Less Than 12	12 But Less Than 14	14 But Less Than 18	18 But Less Than 22	22 and Over
Intern	100.00								
Thru O-6		416.66	1,000.00	958.33	916.66	833.33	750.00	666.66	583.33
Above O-6	583.33	For specific requirements for the pay cited in this table, go to the web at: http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fmr/07a/index.html							
Variable Special Pay (VSP) (Dental Officers)									
Pay Grade	Under 3	3 But Less Than 6	6 But Less Than 8	8 But Less Than 12	12 But Less Than 14	14 But Less Than 18	18 & Over		
Intern	250.00								
Thru O-6		583.33	583.33	1,000.00	833.33	750.00	666.67		
Above O-6	583.33								
Board Certified Pay Special Pay (Medical and Dental Officers)					Additional Special Pay (ASP) (Dental Officers) (effective April 24, 2008)				
Pay Grade	Under 10	10 But Less Than 12	12 But Less Than 14	14 But Less Than 18	18 & Over	Pay Grade	Under 3	3 But Less Than 10	10 & Over
All Grades	208.33	291.66	333.33	416.66	500.00	All Grades	10,000.00	12,000.00	15,000.00
Incentive Special Pay (Medical Officers)									
Specialty	Annual Amt	Specialty	Annual Amt	Specialty	Annual Amt	Specialty	Annual Amt		
Aerospace Med	20,000.00	General surgery	29,000.00	Otolaryngology	30,000.00	Subspecialty Category I	36,000.00		
Anesthesiology	36,000.00	Internal medicine	20,000.00	Pathology	20,000.00	Subspecialty Category II	28,000.00		
Cardiology	36,000.00	Neurology	20,000.00	Pediatrics	20,000.00	Subspecialty Category III	23,000.00		
Dermatology	20,000.00	Neurosurgery	36,000.00	Phys and Prev/Occ Med	20,000.00	Subspecialty Category IV	20,000.00		
Emergency Med	26,000.00	OB/GYN	31,000.00	Psychiatry	20,000.00	Subspecialty Category V	36,000.00		
Family practice	20,000.00	Ophthalmology	28,000.00	Pulmonary/IM-Critical Care	23,000.00	Urology	28,000.00		
Gastroenterology	26,000.00	Orthopedics	36,000.00	Radiology	36,000.00				

Appendix 3 U.S. Army Decorations and Service Awards

This matrix was originally developed by the author for previous work and appeared in, Brent Clemmer, *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army's Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations.* (Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), Appendix 5. It is a useful quick reference tool showing the dates instituted and criteria for Army awards.

DECORATION	SERVICE	DATE INSTITUTED	CRITERIA
Purple Heart	Army	1782	For Military Merit. Only known to be presented to three soldiers. Disappeared immediately after the Revolutionary War.
Honorary Badge of Distinction	Army	1782	Veteran NCO and soldiers who served more than three years. Disappeared immediately after the Revolutionary War.
Certificate of Merit	Army	1847	For distinguishing oneself in battle, literally a paper certificate until 1905 when it was transferred into metallic form.
Medal of Honor	Army	1861	For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of one's life, above and beyond the call of duty.

SERVICE MEDAL	SERVICE	DATE INSTITUTED	CRITERIA
Spanish Campaign Medal	Army	1905	Service in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands in 1898
Philippine Campaign Medal	Army	1905	Service in the Philippines between 1899-1906
China Campaign Medal	Army	1905	Service in China with the Peking Relief Expedition 1900-1
Philippine Congressional Medal	Army	1906	Service in the Philippines between 1899-1902 and serving longer than discharge date
Civil War Campaign Medal	Army	1907	Service between 15 April 1861 and 9 April 1865
Indian Campaign Medal	Army	1907	Service in the Indian campaigns between 1865-1891
Army of Cuba Pacification Medal	Army	1909	Service in Cuba 1906-9
Army of Cuba Occupation Medal	Army	1915	Service in Cuba between 1898 and 1902
Spanish War Service Medal	Army	1918	Service between 1898-1899 for persons not eligible for the SCM
Army of Puerto Rico Occupation Medal	Army	1919	Service in Puerto Rico between 14 Aug-10 Dec 1898

From WWI to Post WWII

DECORATION	SERVICE	DATE INSTITUTED	CRITERIA
Distinguished Service Cross	Army	1918	Extraordinary heroism not justifying the award of a Medal of Honor; while engaged in an action against an enemy of the U.S. or while serving with friendly foreign forces. The act or acts of heroism must have been so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from their comrades.
Distinguished Service Medal	Army	1918	Exceptionally meritorious service to the government in a duty of great responsibility. The performance must be such as to merit recognition for service which is clearly exceptional. Exceptional performance of normal duty will not alone justify an award of this decoration. For service not related to actual war, the term duty of great responsibility applies to a narrower range of positions than in time of war and requires evidence of conspicuously significant achievement.
Silver Star	All Services	1932	Gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force. The required gallantry while of a lesser degree than that required for the Distinguished Service Cross, must nevertheless have been performed with marked distinction.
Legion of Merit	All Services	1942 retroactive to 1939	Exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services and achievements. For service not related to actual war, the term 'key individuals' applies to a narrower range of positions than in a time of war and requires evidence of significant achievement.
Distinguished Flying Cross	All Services	1926 retroactive to 1917	Heroism or extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight
Soldiers Medal	Army	1926	Heroism not involving actual conflict with an armed enemy of the United States. The performance must have involved personal hazard or danger and the voluntary risk of life.
Bronze Star Medal	All Services	1944 retroactive to 1941	While serving in the United States Armed Forces in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or meritorious service not involving aerial flight. Awards may be made for acts of heroism which are of lesser degree than required for the award of the Silver Star.

Air Medal	All Services	1942 retroactive to 1939	Heroic actions or meritorious service while participating in aerial flight but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying cross.
Army Commendation Medal	Army	1945 retroactive to 1941	Heroism, meritorious achievement or meritorious service. Acts of valor which are of lesser degree than required for award of the Bronze star medal.
Purple Heart	All Services	1932 retroactive to 1917	Any member of the armed forces who has been wounded, killed, or may die of wounds received from an opposing enemy force while in armed combat or as a result of international terrorism.
Army Presidential Unit Citation	Army	1942	Army units for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy.
Army Meritorious Unit Commendation	Army	1944	Army units for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service.

SERVICE MEDAL	SERVICE	DATE INSTITUTED	CRITERIA
World War I Victory Medal	Army	1919	Service between 1917-1918 and in the Expeditionary Forces in Russia 1918-20
Army Good Conduct Medal	Army	1941	Exemplary conduct, efficiency and fidelity during three years of active enlisted service
American Defense Service Medal	All services	1941	12 months of active service between 1939-41
Army of Occupation of Germany Medal	Army	1941	Service in Austria-Hungary or Germany between 1918-1923
American Campaign Medal	All services	1942	Service outside the US in the American theater for 30 days or within the CONUS for one year
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal	All services	1942	Service in the Asiatic-Pacific theater for 30 days or upon receipt of any combat decoration
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal	All services	1942	Service in the European-African-Middle Eastern theater for 30 days or receipt of any combat decoration
Woman's Army Service Medal	Army	1943	Service with both the WAAC and WAC between 1942-1945
World War II Victory Medal	All services	1945	Service between 7 Dec 1941- 31 Dec 1946

From Post WWII to Present

DECORATION	SERVICE	DATE INSTITUTED	CRITERIA
Defense Distinguished Service Medal	All services	9-Jul-73	Exceptionally meritorious service to the United States while assigned to a Joint activity in a position of unique and great responsibility
Defense Superior Service Medal	All services	6-Feb-76	Superior meritorious service to the United States while assigned to a Joint Activity in a position of significant responsibility
Defense Meritorious Service Medal	All services	3-Nov-77	Noncombat meritorious achievement or service while assigned to a Joint Activity
Meritorious Service Medal	Army	16-Jan-69	Outstanding noncombat meritorious achievement or service to the United States
Joint Service Commendation Medal	All services	25-Jun-63	Meritorious service or achievement while assigned to a Joint Activity
Joint Service Achievement Medal	All services	3-Aug-83	Meritorious service or achievement while assigned to a Joint Activity
Army Achievement Medal	Army	1-Aug-81	Awarded to members of the Armed Forces below the rank of colonel who, while serving in any capacity with the Army in an noncombat area, distinguish themselves by outstanding achievement or meritorious service, but not of a nature that would warrant the award of an Army Commendation Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award	All Services	1981	Awarded to Joint Service units for superior meritorious achievement or service
Army Valorous Unit Award	All Services	1963	Awarded to U.S. Army units for outstanding heroism in armed combat against an opposing force
Army Superior Unit Award	All Services	1985	Awarded to U.S. Army units for meritorious performance in difficult and challenging peacetime missions
Army of Occupation medal	All Services	1946	30 consecutive days of service in occupied territories of former enemies during the following period-1945-55 (Berlin 1945-90)
Medal for Humane Action	All Services	1949	120 days of service while participating in or providing support for the Berlin Airlift during the period June 26, 1948 to September 30 1949

Korean Service Medal	All Services	1950	Participation in military operations within the Korean area during 1950-54
National Defense Service Medal	All Services	1953	Any honorable active duty service during any of the prescribed periods (1950-4, 1961-74, 1990-95, 2001-TBD)
Antarctica Service Medal	All Services	1960	30 calendar days of service on the Antarctic Continent
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal	All Services	1961	Participation in military operations not covered by specific war medal
Vietnam Service Medal	All Services	1965	Service in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia or Thailand during between 1965-75
Humanitarian Service Medal	All Services	1977	Direct Participation in specific operations of a humanitarian nature, 1977-Present
N.C.O. Professional Development Ribbon	All Services	1981	Successful completion of designated NCO professional development courses
Army Service Ribbon	All Services	1981	Successful completion of initial entry basic training
Prisoner of War Medal	All Services	1985	Awarded to any member of the U.S. Armed Forces taken prisoner during any armed conflict dating from WWI
Southwest Asia Service Medal	All Services	1992	Active participation in, or support of, Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and/or subsequent follow on operations in Southwest Asia.
Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal	All Services	1993	Awarded for outstanding and sustained voluntary service to the civilian community, 1993-Present
Armed Forces Service Medal	All Services	1995	Participation in military operations not covered by a specific war medal or the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Kosovo Campaign Medal	All Services	2000	Active participation in, or direct support of, Kosovo operations
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal	All Services	2003	Active participation in, or support of, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM and/or subsequent follow-on operations while deployed abroad for service in the Global War on Terrorism, 2001-TBD
Korea Defense Service Medal	All Services	2003	For Service in the Republic of Korea, or the waters adjacent thereto, for a qualifying period of time between 28 July, 1954 and a date TBD
Afghanistan Campaign Medal	All Services	2004	Active service in direct support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 2001-TBD
Iraq Campaign Medal	All Services	2004	Active service in direct support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-TBD
Global war on Terrorism Service Medal	All Services	2004	Active participation in, or service in support of Global War on Terrorism operations on or after 11 September, 2001, 2001-TBD

Appendix 4 Major U.S. Army Badges and Dates Created

BADGE	DATE INSTITUTED	CRITERIA
Army Aviator Badge	1917	Completed prescribed training and tests and be designated as an aviator
Parachutist Badges	1941	Satisfactorily completed the prescribed proficiency tests or have participated in at least one combat jump
Driver and Mechanic Badge	1942	Be assigned as a driver for 12 months or during 8000 miles with no accidents
Combat Infantryman Badge	1943	1. Be an infantryman O-6 and below satisfactory performing infantry duties. 2. Assigned to an infantry unit during such time as the unit is engaged in active ground combat 3. Actively participate in such ground combat
Expert Infantryman Badge	1943	Be in the MOS 11 or 18, meet all prerequisites and proficiency tests prescribed by the US Army Infantry Center
Pathfinder Badge	1944	Completion of the Pathfinder course conducted by the US Army Infantry School
Combat Medical Badge	1945	O-6 and below assigned or attached by orders to any ground combat unit Brigade or smaller who satisfactory perform medical duties while the unit is engaged in active ground combat, provided they are personally present and under fire.
Flight Surgeon Badges	1945	Be a medical service officer satisfactorily completes prescribed requirements
Aviation Badges	1947	Enlisted member on flying status for 12 months or 48 flight hours
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Badges	1950	Completion of conventional render safe qualifications as prescribed for the EOD course of instruction
Parachute Rigger Badge	1951	Complete Parachute Rigger Course
Diver Badges	1960	Meet the qualification requirements as prescribed in AR 611-75
Expert Field Medical Badge	1965	Be a medical career management field member (or 11D) and pass test as prescribed by the US Army Medical Department Center and School
Air Assault Badge	1978	Completion of the Air Assault training course
Military Free Fall Parachutist Badge	1994	Completed prescribed program of instruction or participate in a military free fall combat jump
Combat Action Badge	2005	1. May be awarded to any Soldier. 2. Must be performing assigned duties in an area where hostile fire pay or imminent danger pay is authorized. 3. Soldier must be personally present and actively engaging or being engaged by the enemy, and performing satisfactorily in accordance with the prescribed rules of engagement.


Appendix 5 Department of Defense and Joint Service Awards,

These awards are equivalent to, but have a higher precedence to the Army award shown on the right. The primary impetus for these awards was give the commanders of joint headquarters the ability to use awards without having the process route through a the individuals specific service component.

DoD	Army
Defense Distinguished Service Medal	Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal	Legion of Merit
Defense Meritorious Service Medal	Meritorious Service Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal	Army Commendation Medal
Joint Service Achievement Medal	Army Achievement Medal

Appendix 6 Mission Command Graphic

From Robert L. Caslen, "Change 1 to Field Manual 3-0: The Way the Army Fights Today." (*Military Review*, March-April 2011), 86



JIIM- Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational

Figure 1. Mission command as an activity.

Appendix 7 Example of the type of information used to develop database

BINNEY, MATTHEW

Citation:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star Medal to Matthew Binney, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving as the Medical Sergeant for Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 765 (ODA-765), Company A, 2d Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), during combat operations in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, at Pashmul, Kandahar, Afghanistan, on 24 June 2006. Sergeant Binney's heroic actions, despite two serious wounds, defeated a Taliban attack, saved the lives of his comrades, and prevented the destruction of his team. His actions are in keeping with the highest traditions of military heroism and reflect distinct credit upon himself, the Combined Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, Special Operations Command Central, and the United States Army.

NARRATIVE TO ACCOMPANY AWARD

Staff Sergeant Matthew S. Binney, United States Army, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry in action as the Medical Sergeant for Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 765, in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. On 24 June 2006, while conducting a cordon and search mission to capture or kill Taliban leadership in Panjawi District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, Sergeant Binney was assigned to lead a support by fire element as part of an effort to seize a compound located on key terrain adjacent to the detachment's perimeter. His element consisted of one US Army Embedded Tactical Trainer (ETT), an interpreter, and nine Afghan Soldiers. As they moved to a position approximately 75 meters south of the objective, they came under heavy Taliban fire. Sergeant Binney maneuvered his element through enemy fire to his designated position and prepared his weapons to support the assault. The compound was quickly cleared and secured by the assault team. Immediately following the assault, an unexpectedly large Taliban Force counter-attacked with automatic fires. From his support by fire position, Sergeant Binney initiated lethal direct fires on the enemy, who were attempting to close on the target compound. Sergeant Binney's action blunted the enemy envelopment of the element in the compound. Sergeant Binney's small group immediately began receiving a heavy volume of accurate machinegun, rocket-propelled grenade, and small arms fires from all directions. Sergeant Binney maneuvered his element to close with and destroy an enemy automatic weapon that was placing effective fire on the beleaguered element within the compound. Continuing to maneuver his element, Sergeant Binney moved through an opening in a low mud wall and unknowingly into the midst of group of Taliban fighters. Sergeant Binney, the ETT, and the interpreter reacted with furious fire in several directions and employed hand grenades at extremely close ranges, killing many of the enemy. Groups of enemy fighters continued to approach to within 15 meters and fire directly into Sergeant Binney's position while shouting insults and threats at the Afghan National Army Soldiers, indicating their intent to capture the group. As Sergeant Binney exposed himself to employ a grenade at a nearby group of enemy fighters, a bullet struck him in the back of the head, knocking him down, resulting in his temporary loss of vision and hearing. As he groped for his weapon and attempted to regain his bearings, two Afghan Soldiers were forced to withdraw from their support by fire position, leaving Sergeant Binney's small element further isolated. When Sergeant Binney regained his vision, he returned to cover, refused medical attention, and rejoined the battle. In a valiant attempt to inspire the remaining defenders, he shouted words of encouragement at them and directed their fires against the determined and advancing Taliban. He then led them in an assault upon Taliban fighters who now seemed more determined to capture the isolated element. While attempting to maneuver on the flank of the approaching Taliban

fighters, now as close as ten meters, the ETT was seriously injured by a rocket-propelled grenade. Sergeant Binney, ignoring his own bleeding head wound, selflessly risked his own life while immediately moving to retrieve the injured ETT. Caught in the open and completely exposed to enemy fire, he was brought down a second time by a burst of machine gun fire that destroyed his M4 carbine and shattered his left shoulder and upper arm. As he lay wounded, he continued encouraging the members of his element, and directed their fire as they became the target of an even heavier fusillade of machinegun and rocket-propelled grenade fires. Ignoring his wounds, Sergeant Binney maintained his composure, passed his radio to his interpreter, and assisted in directing a relief force to his position. When the relief force arrived to provide assistance, Sergeant Binney, despite both of his serious wounds, again refused medical assistance and resolved to walk out on his own so that all assistance could be afforded the more seriously wounded ETT. Sergeant Binney's courageous actions and determined spirit not only prevented his small element from being overrun, captured, or destroyed, but decisively engaged and eliminated enemy forces who would have joined the assault on the beleaguered element defending the compound. His gallantry, dedication to duty, and selfless sacrifice exemplified the warrior ethos and directly contributed to the detachment seizing the initiative, denying the enemy the use of key terrain, and forcing the Taliban retreat. The heroic accomplishments of Sergeant Binney reflect great credit upon himself, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, Special Operations Command Central, and the United States Army.

Born: at Payson, Arizona

Home Town: Payson, Arizona

Appendix 8 Letter from 3-2 SBCT commander re Army Achievement Medal



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team,
2d Infantry Division
Camp Liberty, Iraq APO AE 09344



ARROWHEAD
STRYKER BRIGADE

AFZH-IN

11 April 2007

MEMORANDUM THRU

Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09344
Commander, Multi-National Corps - Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09342
Commander, Multi-National Force - Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09342

FOR Commander, HRC, 200 Stovall St, Alexandria, VA 22332

SUBJECT: Authorization to Award the Army Achievement Medal for Wartime Service

1. Recommend the Army authorize the Army Achievement Medal for combat or wartime achievement and valor, much like our sister services in the Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force.

2. Background.

a. The Army Commendation Medal is the lowest level award our Army authorizes for combat or wartime achievement, service or valor. The Army Achievement Medal, introduced into a peacetime Army decades ago to equip the battalion-level commander with a tool to recognize achievements at a lower level than for the ARCOM, is currently not authorized as a wartime or combat award.

b. In this long war against terrorism, countless battlefield achievements and daily acts of valor pass unrecognized because they do not rise to the level required for the ARCOM.

c. The achievement medals of several sister services are already authorized for wartime or combat achievement and valor.

d. This proposal arms the battalion-level commander with the same tool the Army has provided in peacetime, the AAM, to recognize battlefield or wartime achievement and valor.

e. The Army Achievement Medal is already in the Army system and its use is well understood. This proposal can be quickly approved and implemented in our Army with minimum cost or change to policy—improving morale in our combat forces in the field.

3. Conclusion. The Army should quickly approve the Army Achievement Medal for commanders to recognize deserving Soldiers for acts of wartime or combat achievement or valor. The award guidance would mirror that for the ARCOM to include award of the "V" device for Valor, but at a level less than that required for the ARCOM or ARCOM with V.

4. Point of contact for this action is the BDE Adjutant, MAJ Don Fagnan at SVOIP 872-2154 or donald.fagnan@us.army.mil.


STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND
COL, IN
Commanding

Appendix 9 Award Database

Name	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	IZ=0 AF=1	KIA 0=no 1=yes	WIA 0=no 1=yes	While Advising or Partnering ? 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=yes 0=no	Sex M=1 F=0	Year (200X)	SF & Advising correlation	Base/FOB Defense
Allison, Jacob - (OEF)	7			1			1	1	1	7	1	
Ambrosia, Gregory F.			2	1					1	7		
Anderson, Roderick C. - (OEF)	9			1			1	1	1	4	1	
Ayers, Jonathan - (OEF)	4			1	1		1		1	8		1
Baldwin, Jason A. - (OEF)	4			1			1		1	7		1
Begaye, Conrad - (OEF)	5			1			1		1	7		
Behr, Dillon L. - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	1	8	1	
Bergstad, Dillon - (OEF)	4			1		1			1	7		
Betten, Joshua D. - (OEF)	7			1					1	3	0	
Binney, Matthew - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	1	6	1	
Blaskowski, Matt - (OEF)	6			1		1			1	5	0	
Bostick, Thomas - (OEF)			3	1	1		1		1	7		
Bradley, James H. - (OEF)			5	1					1	8		
Brannon, Patrick - (OEF)	6			1					1	5	0	
Brostrom, Jonathan P. - (OEF)			2	1	1				1	8		1
Brown, Jarett - (OEF)	6			1					1	9		
Brown, Monica - (OEF)	3			1					0	7		
Bryant, Christian - (OEF)	6			1					1	7	0	
Bundermann, Andrew L.			2	1			1		1	9		1
Burns, Kyle - (OEF)			2	1					1	6	0	
Camacho, Eddie - (OEF)	4			1					1	3	0	
Carter, Michael D. - (OEF)	4			1			1		1	8		
Canon, Arin K. - (OEF)	6			1					1	2	0	
Casillas, Justin A. - (OEF)	3			1	1				1	9		
Charo, Christopher A. - (OEF)	6								1	7		1
Chester, Ryan S. - (OEF)	4			1					1	9		
Choay, Christopher - (OEF)	6			1					1	5	0	
Clarke, Linsey - (OEF)	6			1			1	1	1	9	1	
Colucci, David G. - (OEF)	6			1					1	4	0	
Cordova, Christopher B.			3	1			1		1	9		1
Coulter, Matthew D. - (OEF)	5						1		1	7		
Cromie, William G. - (OEF)			2	1					1	7		
Crowe, Loren - (OEF)			2	1					1	8		
Davenport, Fredrick - (OEF)	8			1			1	1	1	7	1	
Davis, Aaron - (OEF)	4			1		1			1	8		
Davis, Jefferson Donald - (OEF)	8			1				1	1	1	0	
DeJesus, Angel - (OEF)		2		1				1	1	6	0	
De La Cruz, Victor E. - (OEF)	5			1			1		1	9		1
Debolt, Robert K. - (OEF)	2			1		1			1	8		
Denton, Michael T. - (OEF)	4			1			1		1	8		1
Dennis, Jerod R. - (OEF)	3			1	1	1			1	3	0	
DePouli, Raymond M. - (OEF)	6			1					1	2	0	
Dockery, Lincoln V. - (OEF)	6			1					1	7		
Dwyer, Kenneth M. - (OEF)			3	1		1	1	1	1	6	1	
Eldred, Jerad - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	1	6	1	
Espejo, Michael A. - (OEF)	5			1					1	7		
Espino, Erasmo, Jr. - (OEF)	6			1					1	6	0	
Falkel, Christopher - (OEF)	4			1					1	5	0	
Felix, Bradley M. - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	1	4	1	
Ferrara, Matthew C. - (OEF)			2	1			1		1	7		
Fetty, Jason - (OEF)	6			1			1	1	1	3	1	
Fiesel, Paul D. - (OEF)	8			1			1	1	1	7	1	
Ford, Scott E. - (OEF)	8			1		1	1	1	1	8	1	
Ford, Sheffield F., III - (OEF)			3	1				1	1	6	0	
Fortner, Robert - (OEF)	5			1			1		1	7		
Gallardo, Erick - (OEF)	6			1					1	7		
Giasullo, John - (OEF)	4			1			1		1	8		
Goodin James M. - (OEF)	7			1					1	9		
Grenz, Allen - (OEF)	5			1					1	3	0	

Griffin, Brandon S. - (OEF)			3	1				1	1	7	0	
Grimm, Justin D. - (OEF)	6			1					1	8		1
Gross, Nicholas - (OEF)	6			1			1	1	1	5	1	
Hall, Rashe - (OEF)	6			1		1			1	6	0	
Hammons, Robert J. - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	1	7	1	
Harriman, Stanley Lom - (OEF)		2		1				1	1	2	0	
Harris, Jonathan W. - (OEF)		2		1					1	8		
Hays, John	5			1					1	8		1
Hernandez, Abram - (OEF)	7			1		1	1	1	1	6	1	
Hill, Jonathan G. - (OEF)	7			1			1		1	9		1
Holmes, Bruce - (OEF)	7			1			1	1	1	5	1	
Hope, Jason - (OEF)		1		1				1	1	5	0	
Horton, Eric - (OEF)	7			1		1		1	1	6	0	
Howard, Mark - (OEF)	7			1		1	1	1	1	6	1	
Howard, Seth E. - (OEF)	6			1			1		1	8	1	
Huber, Haldon H. - (OEF)	8			1				1	1	6	0	
Hutchinson, David R. - (OEF)	4			1		1			1	8		
Johns, Stephan - (OEF)	7			1				1	1	4	0	
Johnson, Allen C. - (OEF)	7			1	1	1		1	1	5	0	
Jones, Benjamin - (OEF)	7			1				1	1	4	0	
Julian, Matthew - (OEF)	7			1				1	1	5	0	
Keefe, Matthew - (OEF)	6			1				1	1	5	0	
Kimney, Drew C. - (OEF)	7			1			1	1	1	7	1	
Kinney, Matthew - (OEF)	6			1					1	8		
Lacamera, Paul - (OEF)			5	1					1	2	0	
LaFrenz, Matthew - (OEF)	5			1					1	2	0	
Lamoreaux, Cory L. - (OEF)	8			1					1	2	0	
Lewis, Andrew - (OEF)	7			1				1	1	3	0	
Logsdon, Keith - (OEF)	8			1			1	1	1	5	1	
Lowe, David - (OEF)	7			1			1	1	1	5	1	
Lybert, Patrick - (OEF)	6			1	1	1			1	6	0	
Maholic, Thomas D. - (OEF)	8			1	1	1	1	1	1	6	1	
Maitre, Benjamin - (OEF)			3	1					1	2	0	
Mangels, John E. - (OEF)	7			1		1			1	6	0	
Matlock, Matthew - (OEF)	6			1		1			1	8		
McGuire, Shawn - (OIF)	6			1					1	7	0	
McInerney, Michael J. - (OEF)		1		1			1	1	1	3	1	
McQuade, Sean P. - (OEF)			3	1			1		1	7	0	
Meyer, John A. - (OEF)			2	1			1		1	7		
Morales, Francisco - (OEF)	7			1					1	6	0	
Morales, Luis G. - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	1	8	1	
Morgan, Mike			5	1					1	9		
Mullins, Michael D.	6			1					1	8		
Myer, Matthew R. - (OEF)			3	1			1		1	8		1
Newsom, Alex L. - (OEF)			2	1			1		1	7		
Newton, Casey H. - (OEF)			2	1					1	4	0	
Norton, Michael - (OEF)	6			1					1	9		
Nunez, David	7			1	1			1	1	8		
Olsen, Jeremiah C. - (OEF)	4			1					1	2	0	
Olsen, Richard J. - (OEF)	7			1			1		1	9		
Palumbo, Christopher - (OEF)		3		1			1		1	5	0	
Parson, Robert - (OEF)	4			1					1	9		
Petithory, Daniel Henry - (OEF)	7			1	1	1		1	1	1	0	
Plasterer, Ray A. - (OEF)	7			1					1	8		
Price, Bruce E. - (OEF)		2		1	1	1	1	1	1	4	1	
Pryor, Anthony S. - (OEF)	8			1				1	1	2	0	
Rasmussen, Thomas C. - (OEF)	5			1			1		1	9		1
Ray, Jonathon - (OEF)	7			1					1	3		
Reis, Larry - (OEF)	8			1			1		1	5	0	
Reynolds, Gabriel - (OEF)	5			1				1	1	7		
Ringgenberg, Dirk D. - (OEF)			3	1					1	5	0	
Ritenour, Matthew - (OEF)	6			1		1			1	7	0	
Rivas, Jose M. - (OEF)	5			1			1		1	7	0	
Rohrs, Peter David - (OEF)	6			1					1	7	0	
Roundtree, Cliff - (OEF)	7			1			1	1	1	5	1	
Ruske, Gregory S. - (OEF)	4			1		1	1		1	8		
Samaroo, Sean	6			1			1		1	8		1
Sanderlin, Robert - (OEF)	8			1		1		1	1	7	0	
Sanders, David J. - (OEF)	5			1			1	1	1	8	1	
Sar, Sarun - (OEF)	8			1		1		1	1	5	0	
Scalise, Rodney A. - (OEF)	6			1			1	1	1	6	1	
Scantlin, Jeffery	4			1			1		1	8		1
Schafer, Michael W. - (OEF)	6			1	1	1			1	5	0	
Self, Nathan E. - (OEF)			3	1		1			1	2	0	
Setzer, John - (OEF)	7			1		1			1	3	0	

Appendix 9 continued

Shorter, Randy	7			1				1	8		
Shurer, Ronald J. - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	8	1	
Simmons, Stephen E. - (OEF)	6			1				1	8		1
Small, Andrew R. - (OEF)	3			1	1	1		1	6	0	
Smith, John I. - (OEF)	7			1				1	8		
Smith, Robert J. - (OEF)	5			1			1	1	7		
Spraktes, Emmett - (OEF)	6			1				1	9		
Stebner, Eric W. - (OEF)	5			1				1	2	0	
Stickney, Keith R. - (OEF)	4			1			1	1	9		1
Strickland, Ronald Gregory - (OEF)	7			1				1	7	0	
Tabron, Donald - (OEF)		1		1				1	2	0	
Thibeault, Victor - (OEF)	4			1		1		1	3	0	
Tillman, Pat - (OEF)	4			1			1	1	4	0	
Tomlin, William Charles - (OEF)	7			1				1	7	0	
Totten-Lancaster, Aaron - (OEF)	4			1		1		1	2	0	
Trattles, Patric L. - (OEF)	6			1				1	5	0	
Unger, Dennis - (OEF)	6			1		1		1	8		
Upp, Christopher T. - (OEF)	6			1		1		1	7		1
Vaccaro, Angelo J. - (OEF)	4			1				1	6	0	
Vaccaro, Angelo J. - (OEF)	4			1	1	1		1	6	0	
Viene, Justin - (OEF)	6			1				1	4	0	
Voss, Jude - (OEF)	6			1		1		1	6	0	
Walding, John W. - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	8	1	
Walker, Joshua J. - (OEF)	5			1				1	2	0	
Walton, Kyle M. - (OEF)			3	1			1	1	8	1	
Waters, Gregory	4			1				1	8		
Wells, Christopher B. - (OEF)			4	1			1	1	5	1	
Williams, Mathew O. - (OEF)	5			1			1	1	8	1	
Wilmoth, Harper - (OEF)	6			1				1	2	0	
Wilson, Brian D. - (OEF)	5			1				1	2	0	
Woolley, James - (OEF)		2		1				1	9		
Worhan, Ryan L. - (OEF)			4	1				1	3	0	
Zambarda, Mark A. - (OEF)			2	1				1	9		

Bibliography

- Armor Branch, U.S. Army. "Armor Branch Update Oct 2008." *U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Officer Personnel Management Directorate*. October 2008. [https://www.hrc.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/Armor_Webpage_2009/New_ArmorHomepage\(09\).htm](https://www.hrc.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/Armor_Webpage_2009/New_ArmorHomepage(09).htm) (accessed January 15, 2009).
- Barbero, Michael D. "Infantry Senior Leader Newsletter." *The United States Army Infantry Center and School*. May 5, 2009. <https://www.benning.army.mil/OIP/content/Infantry%20Newsletter/newsletter.htm> (accessed May 5, 2009).
- Baritz, Loren. *Backfire*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- Berlin, H. Robert. *U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A composite Biography*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1989.
- Borch, Fred L., and William R. Westlake. *The Silver Star: A History of America's Third Highest Award for Combat Valor*. Tempe: Borch and Westlake Publishing, 2001.
- Cable, Larry E. *Conflict of Myths The development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*. New York: New York University Press, 1986.
- Caslen, Robert L. "Change 1 to Field Manual 3-0: The Way the Army Fights Today." *Military Review*, March-April 2011: 84-88.
- Center for a New American Security. "Dr. David Kilcullen." *www.cnas.org*. March 1, 2009. <http://www.cnas.org/node/539> (accessed March 1, 2009).
- Clemmer, Brent. *Aligned Incentives: Could the Army's Award System Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations*. Masters of Science Thesis, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009.
- Collier, Peter. *Medal of Honor: portraits of valor beyond the call of duty*. New York: Artisan, 2003.
- Cross, Jesse R. *The Quartermaster General's Newsletter*. Fort Lee, Virginia: Quartermaster School, July-September 2010.
- David, Birch, and Joseph Veroff. *Motivation: A study of Action*. Belmont: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1966.
- Department of Defense. *IRREGULAR WARFARE: COUNTERING IRREGULAR THREATS*. May 17, 2010. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/irregular/iw_joc2_0.pdf (accessed March 1, 2011).
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1. *Army Regulation 600-8-19*. Headquarters Department of the Army, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions.
- . "Army Regulation 600-8-22." *Military Awards*. Headquarters Department of the Army, January 11, 2007.
- Edwards, Bob. "The Purple Heart." *National Public Radio*. May 27, 2002. <http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/patc/purpleheart.html> (accessed May 16, 2011).
- Farwell, Byron. *Stonewall*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.

- Fontaine, Scott. "Seeing Some Quality Bang-Bang." *www.thenewstribune.com*. February 22, 2009.
http://blogs.thenewstribune.com/military/2009/02/22/seeing_some_quality_bang_bang (accessed February 25, 2009).
- Foster, Frank, and Borts Lawrence. *A Complete Guide to All United States Military Medals*. Fountain Inn: MOA Press, 2005.
- Freedberg, Sydney J. "The Other Three Thousand." *www.nationaljournal.com*. January 12, 2007. http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20070113_4.php (accessed October 1, 2008).
- Galula, David. *Counter-Insurgency Warfare*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005.
- Gates, Robert M. "Speech As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, West Point, NY, Friday, February 25 2011." *www.defense.gov*. February 25, 2011.
<http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539> (accessed February 26, 2011).
- Glover, Scott. "Man pleads guilty to lying about medal." *Los Angeles Times*, May 6, 2008: B10.
- Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II*. New York: Random House, 2007.
- Grant, Michael. *The Army of the Caesars*. New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1974.
- Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM I The Army*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005.
- . *FM I The Army*. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2001.
- Henning, Charles A. *Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress*. CRS, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006.
- Hewitt, J. Joseph, Johnathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr. "Peace and Conflict 2008: Executive Summary." *Center for International Development and Conflict Management*. 2008.
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/executive_summary/pc_es_20070613.pdf (accessed March 12, 2009).
- Home of Heros. "U.S. Army Awards of the Silver Star 2001-Present." *www.homeofheros.com*. March 10, 2009.
http://www.homeofheroes.com/valor/08_WOT/ss_GWOT/citations_USA.html (accessed March 10, 2009).
- Hughes, E. W. *Human Relations in Management*. Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1970.
- Hughes, P. R. *A Study of Recognition of the Lesser Achievemnts of Low Ranking Enlisted Men*. MMAS Thesis, Fort Levenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975.
- iCasualties. "U.S. Deaths by Service Branch." *iCasualties.org*. October 1, 2008.
<http://icasualties.org/Iraq/USDeathsByService.aspx> (accessed April 25, 2009).
- International Security Assistance Force. "Honoring Couragious Restraint." *isaf.nato.int*. April 30, 2010. <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/caat-anaysis-news/honoring-courageous-restraint.html> (accessed November 30, 2010).

- Jaffe, Greg. "Army Edits its history of the deadly battle of Wanat." *Washingtonpost.com*. December 28, 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/28/AR2010122804334.html> (accessed December 28, 2010).
- . "Combat Generation: Drone Operators Climb on Winds of Change in the Air Force." *Washington Post*, February 28, 2010: A01.
- Jansen, Erik. *Toward a Strategic Reward System Perspective*. Phd Dissertation from University of Southern California, Unpublished, 1986.
- Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. *Manual For Courts-Martial United States*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008.
- Junger, Sebastian. *War*. New York, NY: Hachette Book Group, 2010.
- Kerr, Steven. "On the Folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B." *Academy of Management Executive* 9, no. 1 (1995): 7-14.
- Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Larteguy, Jean. *The Praetorians*. Translated by Xan Fielding. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 1963.
- Lawernce, T. E. *Revolt in the Desert*. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926.
- Lawrence, T. E. "The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence from the Arab Bulletin #60." *mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil*. August 20, 1917. <http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/docs/The27ArticlesofT.E.Lawrence.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2009).
- Lemieux, Jason. "No, Really: Is the US Military Cut Out For Courageous Restraint?" *smallwarsjournal.com*. July 29, 2009. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/481-lemieux.pdf> (accessed January 5, 2011).
- Levitt, Steven D., and Stephen J. Dunbar. *Freakonomics*. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2005.
- Limbaugh, Rush. "Medal for "Courageous Restraint"." *www.rushlimbaugh.com*. May 12, 2010. http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_051210/content/0112515.guest.html (accessed April 20, 2011).
- Manas, Jerry. *Napoleon on Project Management*. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Inc, 2008.
- McDougall, Walter A. *Promised Land Crusader State*. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1997.
- McMichael, William H. "Hold fire, earn a medal." *Army Times*. May 12, 2010. http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/05/military_restraint_medal_05111ow/ (accessed May 12, 2010).
- Military Awards Branch. "Wartime Award Statistics Operation Iraqi Freedom." Military Awards Branch Updated on 10 September 2008, n.d.

- Miller, T. Christian, and Daniel Zwerdling. "Army Clarifies Purple Heart Rules For Soldiers." *www.npr.org*. March 17, 2011.
<http://www.npr.org/2011/03/17/134604533/army-revising-purple-heart-rules-for-soldiers> (accessed March 17, 2011).
- . "Purple Hearts Elusive For Traumaic Brain Injuries." *www.npr.org*. September 9, 2010.
<http://www.npr.org/2010/09/09/129606127/purple-hearts-elusive-for-traumatic-brain-injuries> (accessed March 17, 2011).
- Myers, Steven Lee. "Admiral, a Suicide, Wins Some Vindication on Combat Awards." *New York Times*, June 25, 1998, Late edition (east Coast) ed.: A15.
- Naylor, Sean. *Not a Good Day to Die*. New York, NY: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005.
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). "Dod News Breifing with Secratary Gates From the Pentagon." *DefenseLink News Transcript*. April 6, 2009.
www.defenselink.mil/transcriptss/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396 (accessed April 7, 2009).
- Ostland, William B. "Tactical Leader Lessons Learned in Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom VIII." *Military Review*, July-August 2009: 2-9.
- Petraeus, David H. "COMSAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance." *afghancoin.harmonieweb.org*. August 1, 2010.
<https://afghancoin.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Announcements/DispForm.aspx?ID=7&Source=https%3A%2F%2Fafghancoin%2Eharmonieweb%2Eorg%Fdefault%2Easpx> (accessed May 16, 2011).
- Pexton, Patrick B. "What Makes A Warrior." *Washington Post*, December 1, 2010: 17.
- Powell, Raymond M. "Medals for Mediocrity: How to Restore Meaning to Air Force Decorations." *www.airpower.au.af.mi*. March 1, 2009.
<http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj09/spr09/powell.html> (accessed March 4, 2009).
- Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New Yok: Penguin Books, 2006.
- . *The Gamble*. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.
- Robertson, William G. *In Contact! Case Studies from the Long War Volume I*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
- Sansone, Carol, and Judith M. Harackiewicz, . *Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motovation*. San Diego: Academic Press, 2000.
- Shanker, Thom, Elizabeth Bumiller, and Rod Nordland. "Dispite Gains, Night Raids Split U.S. and Karzai." *New York Times .com*. November 16, 2001.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/world/asia/16night.html> (accessed May 16, 2011).
- Siegel, Robert. "Army Revises Its History Of 2008 Afghan Battle." *NPR.org*. December 29, 2009. <http://www.npr.org/2010/12/29/132445149/Army-Revises-Its-History-Of-2008-Afghan-Battle> (accessed December 30, 2009).
- Strandberg, John E., and Roger J. Bender. *The Call of Duty: Military Awards and Decorations of the United States of America*. San Jose: James Bender Publishing, 1994.

- U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Military Awards Branch. "Statistics by Region, Conflict or Incident." *www.hrc.army.mil*. April 22, 2009.
https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/awards/STATS/Jan_07_MAB_Statistics_Conflict%2c_Operation%2c_or_Incident.doc (accessed April 22, 2009).
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *FM 3-0 Operations*. Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008.
- . *FM 3-0 Operations Change 1*. Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008.
- . *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*. Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006.
- . *FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency*. Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2009.
- U.S. Army War College. *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2007-2008*. 26th . Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2007.
- US Army Combat Studies Institute. *Wanat Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010.
- . "Wanat OP- REVISED DRAFT 25 June 2009 (2)." *stltoday.com*. January 10, 2011.
<http://images.stltoday.com/stltoday/resources/wanatot.pdf> (accessed January 10, 2011).
- US Central Command (CENTCOM). "Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), with 77 Exhibits and additional enclosures." 12 January 2010.
- "US Ground Forces End Strength." *GlobalSecurity.org*. n.d.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_es.htm (accessed September 13, 2008).
- Vergilius, Publius M. *The Aeneid*. Translated by J.W. Mackail. New York: Random House, 1950.
- Watkins, Jason. "Why We Serve, 5 Spencer brothers serve across 3 military branches." *Army Times*, May 4, 2009: 8.
- White House Press Office. "Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan." *The briefing room*. March 29, 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed January 30, 2011).
- . "Remarks of President Barack Obama--Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Friday, Feb 27, 2009." *whitehouse.gov*. February 27, 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/ (accessed January 3, 2011).
- White, John. "The Award No One Wants." *The New American*, October 29, 2007: 34-38.
- White, Peter. *With the Jocks*. Gloucestershire, England: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2002.
- Breaker Morant*. Directed by Bruce Beresford. Performed by Edward Woodward. 1980.
- Yingling, Paul. "A Failure in Generalship." *Armed Forces Journal*. May 2007.
<http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198> (accessed January 20, 2009).

- . "Irregular Warfare and Adaptive Leadership." *smallwarsjournal.com*. April 2, 2009. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/208-yingling.pdf> (accessed April 5, 2009).
- Zielbauer, Paul Von. "4 G.I.'s Tell of How Iraqi Raid Went Wrong." *nytimes.com*. August 7, 2006. <http://www.nytimes/2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07mission.html> (accessed March 25, 2009).